Monetary Policy

Author(s):  
Christopher Tsoukis

This chapter discusses monetary policy. It is informally divided in two parts: The former discusses the rationale for and the main features of the current institutional ‘architecture’ related to monetary policy. A formal analysis of time inconsistency of optimal discretionary policy and the concomitant inflationary bias is followed by analyses of commitment and reputation. Subsequently, the Chapter looks at possible resolutions of the difficulties associated with discretionary policy, including independent Central Banks and inflation targeting. It also discusses the new features and proposals that emerged post-2007–9. A ‘policy in practice’ section looks at Taylor rules. In the latter part, we review the recent analyses on financial structure and the ‘credit channel(s)’ of monetary policy transmission. The chapter concludes with a review of Quantitative Easing, macroprudential regulation, and the current thinking on monetary policy as part of a wider package of optimal stabilization policy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (35) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Brandao-Marques ◽  
R. Gelos ◽  
Thomas Harjes ◽  
Ratna Sahay ◽  
Yi Xue

Central banks in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) have been modernizing their monetary policy frameworks, often moving toward inflation targeting (IT). However, questions regarding the strength of monetary policy transmission from interest rates to inflation and output have often stalled progress. We conduct a novel empirical analysis using Jordà’s (2005) approach for 40 EMDEs to shed a light on monetary transmission in these countries. We find that interest rate hikes reduce output growth and inflation, once we explicitly account for the behavior of the exchange rate. Having a modern monetary policy framework—adopting IT and independent and transparent central banks—matters more for monetary transmission than financial development.


2010 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
PIERRE L. SIKLOS

Until the end of 2005 there were few outward signs that the inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy strategy was deemed fragile or that the likelihood of abandoning it was high. In light of the severe economic downturn and the global financial crisis that has afflicted most economies around the world since at least 2008, it is worth reconsidering the question of the fragility of the inflation targeting regime. This paper reprises the approach followed in Siklos (2008) but adds important new twists. For example, the present study asks whether the continued survival of IT is due to the fact that some of the central banks in question did take account of changes in financial stress. The answer is no. Indeed, many central banks are seen as enablers of rapid asset price increases. The lesson, however, is not that inflation targeting needs to be repaired. Instead, refinements should be considered to the existing inflation targeting strategy which has evolved considerably since it was first introduced in New Zealand 20 years ago. Most notably, there should be continued emphasis on inflation as the primary nominal anchor of monetary policy, especially in emerging market economies (EME), even if additional duties are assigned to central banks in response to recent events.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-135
Author(s):  
Olga Kuznetsova ◽  
Sergey Merzlyakov ◽  
Sergey Pekarski

The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has changed the landscape for monetary policy. Many central banks in developed economies had to employ various unconventional policy tools to overcome a liquidity trap. These included large-scale asset purchase programs, forward guidance and negative interest rate policies. While recently, some central banks were able to return to conventional monetary policy, for many countries the effectiveness of unconventional policies remains an issue. In this paper we assess diverse practices of unconventional monetary policy with a particular focus on expectations and time consistency. The principal aspect of successful policy in terms of overcoming a liquidity trap is the confidence that interest rates will remain low for a prolonged period. However, forming such expectations faces the problem of time inconsistency of optimal policy. We discuss some directions to solve this problem.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Ergys Misha

The Taylor’s Rule Central Banks is applying widely today from Central Banks for design the monetary policy and for determination of interest rates. The purpose of this paper is to assess monetary policy rule in Albania, in view of an inflation targeting regime. In the first version of the Model, the Taylor’s Rule assumes that base interest rate of the monetary policy varies depending on the change of (1) the inflation rate and (2) economic growth (Output Gap).Through this paper it is proposed changing the objective of the Bank of Albania by adding a new objective, that of "financial stability", along with the “price stability”. This means that it is necessary to reassess the Taylor’s Rule by modifying it with incorporation of indicators of financial stability. In the case of Albania, we consider that there is no regular market of financial assets in the absence of the Stock Exchange. For this reason, we will rely on the credit developmet - as a way to measure the financial cycle in the economy. In this case, the base rate of monetary policy will be changed throught: (1) Targeting Inflation Rate, (2) Nominal Targeting of Economic Growth, and (3) Targeting the Gap of the Ratio Credit/GDP (mitigating the boom cycle, if the gap is positive, and the contractiocycle if the gap is negative).The research data show that, it is necessary that the Bank of Albania should also include in its objective maintaining the financial stability. In this way, the contribution expected from the inclusion of credit gap indicators in Taylor’s Rule, will be higher and sustainable in time.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Walter

In the 1980s, central banks around the world stumbled upon a new method for conducting theirmonetary policy: instead of the heavy-handed, „hydraulic“ manipulation of monetary aggregates,they learned to „govern the future“ by managing the expectations of market actors directly.New and better indicators and forecasts would provide the basis for a new communicativecoordination of markets expectations, permitting a more fine-grained and effective implementationof monetary policy, particular in controlling inflation.Focusing on the US Federal Reserve’s prototype development of inflation-targeting, this paper putsthis storyline to the test. Against the recent trend in sociology to conceive of expectations andfuturity as modes of coordination that thrive under conditions of (fundamental) uncertainty that defyrational calculation, I argue that futurity and the formation expectations inextricably depend onprior processes of formalization.Examining the transition to modern ‘inflation targeting’ monetary policy, I show how theeffectiveness of coordination by expectation is achieved by extensive processes of proceduralizationand standardization. While increasing the technical efficiency of fine-tuning expectations, thesegains are only possible because of the procedural narrowing of the scope of communicativeinteraction, which may significantly affect the overall effectiveness of this mode of coordination.I conclude with a call to more closely examine how formal and informal modes of coordination aremutually interdependent – and how the nature of their entanglements affects their effectiveness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1850232
Author(s):  
Mehdi S. Monadjemi

Because of volatility, commodity prices are excluded from the CPI when inflation targeting is exercised. Rising commodity prices contribute to inflation but central banks show no reaction since the CPI does not register rise in prices. Frankel (2006) argues that monetary policy should consider the price of important export commodities such as oil, in oil exporting countries. He maintains that by doing so, central banks are able to benefit from the fluctuations of the exchange rate in the presence of a negative international trade shocks. Central banks cannot benefit from the fluctuation of the exchange rate if inflation targeting is the strategy for conducting monetary policy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kateřina Šmídková ◽  
Miroslav Hrnčíř

This paper argues that inflation targeting is a strategy that can be under certain conditions adopted by central banks in countries in transition even though their typical goal is to disinflate instead of stabilising low inflation. On the one hand, according to the Czech experience, inflation targeting offers several benefits, such as increasing control over expectations and short-term flexibility of monetary strategy, that are attractive for economy in transition. On the other hand, constraints imposed by period of transition as well as by openness of economy are present no matter which monetary strategy is chosen by the central bank. Implied costs should not be attributed to a particular monetary strategy. Inflation targeting has made various factors constraining monetary policy more visible and, as a result, requirements on the quality of decisions as well as on communication strategy have increased.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-151
Author(s):  
Muhammad Edhie Purnawan ◽  
Retno Riyanti

Entering the millennial era, technology has taken a big role in most sectors of life, including the currency as a product that can only be issued by the central bank. This paper examines the significant effect of central bank digital currency (CBDC) on the design of central bank monetary policy. The paper then sets out some benchmark central bank digital currency (CBDC) in several countries. Many central banks are actively exploring the initiation of sovereign digital currencies. Primary results this study is CBDC providing new monetary instruments, CBDC can improve financial inclusion, and CBDC is potential improvements in monetary policy transmission.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (196) ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels-Jakob Hansen ◽  
Alessandro Lin ◽  
Rui Mano

Inequality is increasingly a concern. Fiscal and structural policies are well-understood mitigators. However, less is known about the potential role of monetary policy. This paper investigates how inequality matters for monetary policy within a tractable Two-Agent New Keynesian model that captures important dimensions of inequality. We find some support for making inequality an explicit target for monetary policy, particularly if central banks follow standard Taylor rules.


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