The czech experience with inflation targeting in transition

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kateřina Šmídková ◽  
Miroslav Hrnčíř

This paper argues that inflation targeting is a strategy that can be under certain conditions adopted by central banks in countries in transition even though their typical goal is to disinflate instead of stabilising low inflation. On the one hand, according to the Czech experience, inflation targeting offers several benefits, such as increasing control over expectations and short-term flexibility of monetary strategy, that are attractive for economy in transition. On the other hand, constraints imposed by period of transition as well as by openness of economy are present no matter which monetary strategy is chosen by the central bank. Implied costs should not be attributed to a particular monetary strategy. Inflation targeting has made various factors constraining monetary policy more visible and, as a result, requirements on the quality of decisions as well as on communication strategy have increased.

2019 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 591-595
Author(s):  
PETER DIETSCH

Delegation to independent agencies can reap real benefits for policy-making. In the case of monetary policy, it shores up the credibility of the central bank. However, the discretion of IAs needs to be constrained to ensure their legitimacy. This letter focuses on one potential constraint, namely, the idea that IAs should not make choices on distributional trade-offs. Given that monetary policy today has significant distributive consequences, if this constraint were respected, the independence of central banks would have to be repealed. This would be just as undesirable as a monetary policy whose distributive consequences remain unchecked. Instead, this letter encourages the search for alternative solutions and puts forward three possible institutional arrangements to manage the tension between the distributive consequences of monetary policy on the one hand and central bank legitimacy on the other.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1.000-31.000
Author(s):  
Troy A. Davig ◽  
◽  
Andrew Foerster ◽  

Despite the ubiquity of inflation targeting, central banks communicate their frameworks in a variety of ways. No central bank explicitly expresses their conduct via a policy rule, which contrasts with models of policy. Central banks often connect theory with their practice by publishing inflation forecasts that can, in principle, implicitly convey their reaction function. We return to this central idea to show how a central bank can achieve the gains of a rule-based policy without publicly stating a specific rule. The approach requires central banks to specify an inflation target, inflation tolerance bands, and provide economic projections. When inflation moves outside the band, inflation forecasts provide a time frame over which inflation will return to within the band. We show how this communication replicates and provides the same information as a rule-based policy. In addition, the communication strategy produces a natural benchmark for assessing central bank performance.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Dal-Pont ◽  
Dominique Torre ◽  
Elise Tosi

The paper presents a model analyzing the degrees of freedom of an independent but committed Central Bank within a monetary union. In the model, interactions between Agents, Supranational Political Authorities and the Central Bank of the Union determine the current nominal and real outcomes. Imperfectly distributed information on shocks affecting supply, transmission channels and short-term expectations create opportunities for a Central Bank to deviate from its announced objective. This opportunity to deviate especially applies to Central Banks free from any kind of inflationary bias and committed to a strictly nominal target. Under certain conditions we show that nominal deviations from stated targets are not observable either by Agents or the Supranational Political Authority that periodically selects the membership of the Council of Monetary Policy of the Bank. Those deviations increase the variance of nominal values but dampen fluctuations of real income. Our results confirm, within a monetary union, the position defended by Cukierman and Metzler concerning the efficiency of a Central Bank’s ambiguous behaviour.


Author(s):  
Joerg Bibow

Central bank independence (CBI) refers to the relation between the central bank and the state, the legislature and executive. In practice, central banks typically engage in a wide range of activities related to the currency sphere and the financial system. The mainstream literature popularizing CBI features a “narrow central bank” approach that concentrates on central banks’ monetary policy functions only, ignoring important interdependencies between monetary policy on the one hand, and central banks’ historical role as government’s banker (as one link to fiscal policy) and their role in safeguarding the financial system’s stability on the other. This chapter investigates the rise in CBI as an apparent success story in modern monetary economics. The worldwide rise in CBI is partly due to the advent of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. This chapter also discusses the time-inconsistency argument for CBI, post-Keynesian criticisms of CBI, and whether John Maynard Keynes’s model of CBI strikes a sound balance between democracy and efficiency.


2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 910-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan S Blinder ◽  
Michael Ehrmann ◽  
Marcel Fratzscher ◽  
Jakob De Haan ◽  
David-Jan Jansen

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication—mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-28
Author(s):  
Mimi Kodheli ◽  
Arjeta Vokshi

Central Bank is one of the most important institutions of a country because its responsibility is to draw and implement the monetary policy. The central bank, in order to accomplish this responsibility, has to have a clearly defined main objective, the instruments that will use to achieve the objective, and it should be able to make precise or very good forecasts of macroeconomic variables. In order to make these forecasts, the central bank should first of all understand every monetary transmission mechanism and determine the most effective one. The success or non-success of monetary policy, living apart the other factors, depends on the monetary regime implemented in the country. In the last years, a lot of countries have implemented the inflation targeting regime. One of the conditions of the implementation of the inflation targeting regime is that the central bank should be able to make precise forecasts. For this reason, the structural macroeconomic models, in these days, have became very used because the central banks have used these models as a basis for the policy decision-making based in forecasts. The main goal of these models is to provide a more structured input for the monetary policy decision making, helping to create a full ‘history’ and helping to explain the consequences of different external shocks and different policy rules.Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model is one of the most used forecasting models in the countries that have implemented the inflation targeting regime. Albania is one of the countries that want to formally implement the inflation targeting regime and give up the monetary targeting regime. Now for now Bank of Albania is using the MEAM model as a macroeconomic model of forecasting. In we look at the experience of the other countries that have implemented the inflation targeting regime and the recommendations of the foreign experts, we can conclude that Bank of Albania should work and should evaluate a DSGE model. This is the main reason why this paper is focused on the theoretical analysis of the DSGE model. In the paper will be presented arguments that explain why this is a good forecasting model for Albania. The arguments will be given based on the analysis of the characteristics of this type of model. Also in this paper we will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this type of model. This analysis will help us strengthen the arguments about the necessity of use of this model from Bank of Albania.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter introduces conventional monetary policy, i.e. monetary policy during periods of economic and financial stability and when short-term interest rates are not constrained by the zero lower bound. We introduce the concept of an operational target of monetary policy and explain why central banks normally give this role to the short-term interbank rate. We briefly touch macroeconomics by outlining how central banks should set interest rates across time to achieve their ultimate target, e.g. price stability, and we acknowledge the complications in doing so. We then zoom further into monetary policy operations and central bank balance sheets by developing the concepts of autonomous factor, monetary policy instruments, and liquidity-absorbing and liquidity providing balance sheet items. Subsequently we explain how these quantities relate to short-term interest rates, and how the central bank can rely on this relation to steer its operational target, and thereby the starting point of monetary policy transmission. Finally, we explain the importance of the collateral framework and related risk control measures (e.g. haircuts) for the liquidity of banks and for the conduct of central bank credit operations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Shorsh Qadir Ali

It is known that the digital currency is not supported by any official entity and is used by the Internet only within the scope of institutions, companies and individuals that prefer to deal with them, and can be exchanged in paper currencies such as dollars, euros and others .The purpose of this research is to explain the impact of digital currencies in monetary policy, beginning with the concept of digital currency and its origin and types, on the one hand, and then explain the monetary policy and its goals and objectives used to achieve economic balance in any country on the other hand , The research adopted a descriptive analytical method to determine the effect of the digital currency in monetary policy. The research reached a number of conclusions, the most important of which is that the digital currency affects the tools and objectives of monetary policy negatively and that the digital currency affects the function of the central bank in controlling and directing credit because digital currencies are difficult to control Or direct them .  


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
Ladi R. Bala-Keffi ◽  
Donald G. Mbaka ◽  
Nuruddeen Usman

Core inflation measures have played an important role in the conduct of monetary policy at various central banks around the world. We examine core inflation in Nigeria using non-traditional measures and assess their persistence, to determine whether the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should pay attention to one or other of these measures when assessing inflation developments. We find that the two new measures outperform the official core rate in tracking the persistence of headline inflation. The findings of this study will aid policy making within the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) particularly where inflation targeting is adopted as the monetary policy framework. These core inflation measures provide a useful guide to central bankers both for monetary policy decisions and as a communication tool. They are a better predictor of future inflation depicting the more persistent influences on underlying inflation, which are of interest to policymakers (e.g. Clark, 2001; Blinder and Reis, 2005; Smith, 2004 and Dolmas &Wynne, 2008).


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