Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 321-347
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Consent ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Justified Belief

In “Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency,” Jennifer Lackey examines sexual consent in the context of the widely accepted thesis that knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible action; that is, the view according to which if someone knows a given proposition, then it is epistemically permissible for this person to act on it. To the extent that this is denied, it is argued that either more, or less, than knowledge is required, such as certainty or justified belief. Lackey shows that being able to act on knowledge that someone has consented to sex provides an interesting challenge to this framework. In particular, Lackey argues that someone may know that another consents to sex and yet it may still be epistemically impermissible to act on this knowledge. This is clearest when the knowledge of the consent in question is secondhand, rather than firsthand.

#consent: University students’ perceptions of their sexual consent education

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-166
Author(s):  
Airica MacDougall ◽  
Sarah Craig ◽  
Kaitlyn Goldsmith ◽  
E. Sandra Byers
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Sexual Consent

Justificación, educación y libertad

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Mónica Gómez Salazar
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemological Pluralism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

This paper argues the thesis that education should be understood as a guide that directs the young people towards reflexive and imaginative social practices that allow them to formulate new and varied hypotheses as well as alternative justifications. Based on Dewey, we will expose that a goal such as this is only applicable to members of a democratic society. Next, we present some features of onto-epistemological pluralism in relation to freedom and responsibility. It is concluded that there is no justification that is closer to truth or reality. The relevance of a justified belief with good reasons lies in its practical consequences for specific conditions of existence.

Evidence and Its Limits

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Way Of Thinking

On a standard way of thinking about the relationships between evidence, reasons, and epistemic justification, a subject’s evidence consists of her potential reasons for her beliefs, these reasons constitute the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe, and justification is taken to result from relations between a subject’s potential reasons for her beliefs and those beliefs. This chapter argues that this view makes a number of mistakes about the rational roles of reasons and evidence and explores some parallels between practical and theoretical reasons. Just as justified action is unobjectionable action, justified belief is unobjectionable belief. Just as you cannot object to someone deciding to do something simply on the grounds that their reasons for acting didn’t give them strong reason to act, you cannot object to someone believing something simply on the grounds that they didn’t believe for reasons that gave their beliefs strong evidential support.

EPISTEMIC AGENCY: SOME DOUBTS

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran Setiya
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Agency

Sexual Consent without Passivity

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Dougherty
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Activity ◽  
Sexual Consent ◽  
Sexual Offence ◽  
Sexual Encounter ◽  
John Gardner

Abstract In “The Opposite of Rape,” John Gardner defends two central claims. The first claim is that consent is not necessary for morally permissible sex and the second claim is that giving consent pride of place in sexual offence policy has the unwelcome consequence of reinforcing sexist ideology. Gardner’s arguments for both claims rely on what I call the “Passive Consent Thesis” which is the thesis that “if A gives consent to B in a sexual encounter, then A is passive and B is active in the encounter.” Gardner argues that if sex that is good in a key respect, then they engage in joint sexual activity that is free of this asymmetry of agency. Building on work by Karamvir Chadha, I respond that even if someone is passive with respect to the action to which they consent, they can still be active with respect to a different action that they perform themselves. Consequently, I maintain that two people can give each other consent while engaging in joint sexual activity.

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