Agent-Relative Prerogatives

2020 ◽  
pp. 58-96
Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong
Keyword(s):  
Innocent Person ◽  
Means Principle ◽  
Defensive Harm

Chapter 3 defends the view that we each possess a limited agent-relative prerogative to impose harm on people who are not liable to this harm in defence of things over which we have rightful claims. The chapter argues that this prerogative is needed to satisfactorily explain cases where someone who is not liable to defensive harm threatens an innocent person, for example, cases involving Nonresponsible Threats or Justified Attackers. The chapter also argues that the agent-relative prerogative to defensively harm nonliable persons is constrained by a particular version of the means principle. The chapter concludes by addressing a number of potential objections.

‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe
Keyword(s):  
Correct Account ◽  
Defensive Harm

AbstractAn agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness of her actions, and/or her accountability for any harms that result from her actions (where accountability includes liability to defensive harm, punishment, blame and compensation). This paper does not provide an account of the wrongness of moral coercion. Rather, I argue that, whatever the correct account of its wrongness, the mere fact of being coerced has no bearing on what the agent may do, on the voluntariness of her action, or her accountability for any resultant harm, compared to otherwise identical cases arising from duress and happenstance.

The “Magnificent Seven Errors” in Forensic Autopsy Practice: The Italian Context

2021 ◽  
pp. 192536212110561
Author(s):  
Roberto Scendoni ◽  
Piergiorgio Fedeli ◽  
Nunzia Cannovo ◽  
Mariano Cingolani
Keyword(s):  
Medical Doctor ◽  
Forensic Autopsy ◽  
Criminal Investigation ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Judicial Investigation ◽  
Chain Of Custody ◽  
Italian Context ◽  
First Time ◽  
Video Material

According to the Italian legal system, forensic autopsies are performed by a medical doctor specialized in legal medicine, otherwise known as a medicolegal expert (MLE), who has a range of very complex responsibilities. Indeed, the quality of forensic autopsy activity is always questioned in courts of law; incorrect assessments are dangerous because they can jeopardize the validity of a criminal investigation and thus affect the outcome so that a real culprit may be acquitted or an innocent person convicted. Nonconformities also discredit the professionalism of the specialist who performs the autopsy. The work of a MLE implies a series of assignments and duties that should be given constant consideration, but when certain aspects of this activity are underestimated or overlooked, this can lead the expert to make mistakes with irreparable consequences for the judicial investigation. In this article, for the first time, we present a summary of seven known errors related to autopsy activity following death by unnatural causes, with the purpose of alerting MLEs who work under the Italian judicial system to the potential dangers of such errors. These relate to: oversights in autopsy technique, incorrect collection of photographic and video material, unauthorized attendance at the autopsy, missing/mistaken reporting at any stage of the forensic activity, failure to notify the party forensic consultant, using histological or toxicological nonaccredited laboratories for forensic activities, and lack of observance of the chain of custody.

The Levite’s Concubine (Judg 19:2) and the Tradition of Sexual Slander in the Hebrew Bible: How the Nature of Her Departure Illustrates a Tradition’s Tendency

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 519-539
Author(s):  
Jason Bembry
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Clear Pattern ◽  
Critical Problem ◽  
The People ◽  
Sexual Slander

Abstract In explaining a text-critical problem in Judges 19:2 this paper demonstrates that MT attempts to ameliorate the horrific rape and murder of an innocent person by sexual slander, a feature also seen in Balaam and Jezebel. Although Balaam and Jezebel are condemned in the biblical traditions, it is clear that negative portrayals of each have been augmented by later tradents. Although initially good, Balaam is blamed by late biblical tradents (Num 31:16) for the sin at Baal Peor (Numbers 25), where “the people begin to play the harlot with the daughters of Moab.” Jezebel is condemned for sorcery and harlotry in 2 Kgs 9:22, although no other text depicts her harlotry. The concubine, like Balaam and Jezebel, dies at the hands of Israelites, demonstrating a clear pattern among the late tradents of the Hebrew Bible who seek to justify the deaths of these characters at the hands of fellow Israelites.

scholarly journals PROPERTY LIABILITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR IN THE REHABILITATION OF THE ACCUSED

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-903
Author(s):  
D.V. Tatianin
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Criminal Case ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Investigation Process

The article addresses the issues of the investigator’s liability in deciding on the acquittal of the defendant to whom he or she has been charged and the criminal case was sent to the court with the indictment. The view is maintained that the investigator’s responsibility can only occur if the fact of bringing a knowingly innocent person to criminal responsibility is proved with the investigator playing an active role in the fabrication of criminal case materials. When a person is prosecuted on the basis of an assessment of the totality of the available evidence, which at the hearing did not find confirmation for various reasons, prosecuting an investigator seems unacceptable. The investigator investigates the crime in the context of a pronounced opposition to the investigation process from interested parties, the evidence base is created in the specified conditions, before the criminal case is sent to the court, participants in the process are exposed to various forms in order to obtain the necessary evidence from them. A change in the evidence system may be related to counteracting the investigation process, in this situation it is unacceptable for the investigator to be held accountable for unjustified criminal prosecution.

Responsibility and Liability

2020 ◽  
pp. 133-159
Author(s):  
Victor Tadros
Keyword(s):  
Defensive Harm ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Broad Consensus

There is a broad consensus that something like responsibility or choice impacts on a person’s liability to defensive harm. But beyond that, there is little consensus. This chapter considers several influential views about the significance of responsibility. Some, such as the luck egalitarian view, are found to be badly incomplete. Others, such as the protective value of choice, fail to explain the significance of a person’s relationship with a threat for liability. However, the chapter broadly defends the significance of choice in some cases of culpable and non-culpable threat-causing conduct.

Rights and Evidence

2020 ◽  
pp. 151-174
Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong
Keyword(s):  
Moral Rights ◽  
Epistemic Position ◽  
Defensive Harm

Some philosophers endorse a fact-relative account of moral rights against harm. According to this view, if B’s ϕ‎-ing would contravene A’s right not to be harmed if B had access to all the facts, then B contravenes A’s right by ϕ‎-ing regardless of her epistemic position. Chapter 6 argues that moral rights against harm are not fact-relative, but must rather be sensitive, to a certain extent, to the evidence that duty-bearers can reasonably be expected to possess. The chapter argues that this conception of moral rights against harm has important implications for liability to defensive harm. In particular, people who pose fact-relative wrongful harm are not always liable to defensive harm, since such people may not threaten anyone’s moral rights via their actions.

‘Sweets to the Sweet’: from ‘The Forbidden’ to Candyman

Candyman ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Jon Towlson
Keyword(s):  
Source Material ◽  
Eternal Life ◽  
Housing Estate ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Housing Project ◽  
Subsequent Work ◽  
Green Housing ◽  
Fantasy World ◽  
The Social ◽  
Urban Legend

This chapter discusses the intersection between Clive Barker's work and that of Bernard Rose; surprisingly, the two are closely connected, even symbiotic. Rose's UK debut film Paperhouse (1988) concerned the fantasy world of a young girl, and his subsequent work has shown a tendency towards transgression and transcendence, and repeated returns to social horror. Indeed, Rose was attracted to Barker's ‘The Forbidden’ because he wanted to ‘deal with the social stuff’. Relocating the action from a Liverpool housing estate to Chicago's notorious Cabrini-Green housing project, Rose extended the story, adding the innocent-person-on-the-run plot twist, and took Barker's conclusion further. But the class subtext, the urban legend and the idea of the myth biting back after attempts are made to debunk it, are all there in Barker's source material. The heroine, Helen Lyle, discovers that her normal life is more banal and morally dead than the eternal life-in-myth that the Candyman offers her.

A Theory of Rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-99
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Basic Structure ◽  
Means Principle ◽  
The Core

This chapter covers the theory of rights that sits at the core of this book. It starts with an account of the purpose of rights, the three principles that ground the space of rights, and the basic structure of rights, known as the mechanics of claims. Next, it gives a more formal account of what is meant by the mechanics of claims. It then contrasts it with the infringement model. Finally, it introduces, explains, and defends the restricting claims principle, which, in turn, can be used to defend a key principle in deontology: the means principle, that is, the principle that it is particularly hard to justify using another as a means if doing so imposes some cost on him, unless he has waived or forfeited his right not to be so used.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document