The Epistemology of Prejudice Acquisition

Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 61-76
Author(s):  
Endre Begby

The standard analysis of the epistemology of prejudice often assumes that we might simply define prejudice as a type of belief acquired or maintained without regard to one’s evidence, and therefore as involving some kind of breakdown of epistemic rationality. We now move to assess this assumption on its merits. Chapter 4 considers the problem in light of the acquisition of prejudiced belief. It argues that canons of inductive inference as well as considerations from the epistemology of testimony strongly support the view that individuals can come to acquire prejudiced belief without compromising their epistemic rationality. In fact, given the information environments they find themselves in, these might well be the beliefs that they should form, epistemically speaking, in the simple sense these are the beliefs that are best supported by their evidence. There is no conceptual barrier to understanding how people could be epistemically justified in acquiring prejudiced beliefs.

Author(s):  
O. I. Admakin ◽  
I. A. Solop ◽  
A. D. Oksentyuk

Relevance. The narrowing of the maxilla is one of the most common pathologies in orthodontics. Recent studies show that the narrowing is always asymmetric which is connected to the rotation of the maxilla. To choose the treatment correctly one need a calculation that reveals the asymmetry, which is impossible with using standard indexes.Purpose – to compare efficiency of indexes of Pont and Korkhause with the Kernott's method in patients with narrowing of the maxilla.Materials and methods. The study involved 35 children aged from 8 to 12 years old undergoing dental treatment in the University Children's Clinical Hospital of the First Moscow State Medical University with no comorbidities. For every patient a gypsum model was prepared and after that to carry out the biometrical calculation. In this study two indexes were used: Pont's index and Korkhause's; using this standard analysis the narrowing of the maxilla was revealed. After using Pont's Index and Korkhaus analysis all the models were calculated by the method of Kernott with Kernott's dynamic pentagon.Results. As a result of the analysis of the control diagnostic models a narrowing of the maxilla in 69% of cases (n = 24) was revealed in all cases, the deviation of the size of the dentition was asymmetric. Thus, 65% of the surveyed models showed a narrowing on the right. This narrowing was of a different severity and averaged 15 control models.Conclusions. This shows that for the biometrics of diagnostic models it is necessary to use methods that allow to estimate the width of the dentition rows on the left and on the right separately. To correct the asymmetric narrowing of the dentition, it is preferable to use non-classical expanding devices that act equally on the left and right sides separetly.


Author(s):  
David Owens

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding speech acts like promising and the epistemic norms that govern the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by (intentionally) expressing belief. The expression of belief is distinguished from the communication of belief. The chapter goes on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory, arguing that memory and testimony are mechanisms that can preserve the rationality of the belief they transmit without preserving the evidence on which the belief was originally based.


Author(s):  
Peter J. Graham

“Content Preservation” by Tyler Burge is one of the most influential articles in the epistemology of testimony. Burge argues for three theses: (1) That we enjoy a prima facie entitlement to take testimony (presentations-as-true) at face value, (2) That this entitlement has an a priori basis, based in the nature of reason, and (3) That in some cases testimony-based beliefs are warranted a priori. Most of the debate in the testimony literature is over the truth of (1). Most of the criticism of Burge’s paper focuses on (3). Burge has since abandoned (3). What about (2)? Burge’s argument for (2) is compressed; the underlying nuts and bolts are difficult to understand. This chapter reconstructs Burge’s overall teleo-functional reliabilist framework and then reconstructs Burge’s overall argument for (2) in some detail. Three criticisms are then offered of the argument. Even granting (1), Burge’s argument does not establish (2).


Author(s):  
Jacob Stegenga

This chapter introduces the book, describes the key arguments of each chapter, and summarizes the master argument for medical nihilism. It offers a brief survey of prominent articulations of medical nihilism throughout history, and describes the contemporary evidence-based medicine movement, to set the stage for the skeptical arguments. The main arguments are based on an analysis of the concepts of disease and effectiveness, the malleability of methods in medical research, and widespread empirical findings which suggest that many medical interventions are barely effective. The chapter-level arguments are unified by our best formal theory of inductive inference in what is called the master argument for medical nihilism. The book closes by considering what medical nihilism entails for medical practice, research, and regulation.


Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Matt Weiner

Abstract I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows from the epistemology of testimony, in that false or unjustified testimony weakens the reason for belief that is provided by the speaker's future testimony.


Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Paul Thagard

This paper naturalizes inductive inference by showing how scientific knowledge of real mechanisms provides large benefits to it. I show how knowledge about mechanisms contributes to generalization, inference to the best explanation, causal inference, and reasoning with probabilities. Generalization from some A are B to all A are B is more plausible when a mechanism connects A to B. Inference to the best explanation is strengthened when the explanations are mechanistic and when explanatory hypotheses are themselves mechanistically explained. Causal inference in medical explanation, counterfactual reasoning, and analogy also benefit from mechanistic connections. Mechanisms also help with problems concerning the interpretation, availability, and computation of probabilities.


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