A Better Approach

Prejudice ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 174-192
Author(s):  
Endre Begby
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Opposite Direction ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility

But maybe the relation between morality and epistemology runs in the opposite direction, and it is the range of our epistemic responsibility which constrains the range of our moral responsibility. Initially, this may seem like an unwelcome thought. To the contrary, this chapter argues that it can serve to empower victims of prejudice seeking redress. Moral responsibility is a multi-dimensional concept: while it is plausible that ascriptions of moral blame track ascriptions of epistemic responsibility, other forms of moral liability do not. Drawing on insights from tort law and discrimination law, this chapter argues that victims’ claims to have been wronged in no way depends on their ability to demonstrate that their victimizers were positioned to know that their actions were wrong. This frees victims of prejudice from the substantial burden of having to show that prejudiced believers are—universally, or in any specific case—epistemically irrational in believing as they do.

scholarly journals The Epistemological and the Moral/Political in Epistemic Responsibility: Beginnings and Reworkings in Lorraine Code’s Work

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Koggel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Feminist Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility

This is the first paper in the invited collection. Koggel starts with Code’s first book to record the key objections she raises against traditional and mainstream epistemological accounts. They are the sort of objections that will thread their way through all her work and be important to the development of feminist epistemology. I will then introduce, summarize, and discuss the work Code does on virtue ethics in Epistemic Responsibility and speculate on why she abandons this path in the rest of her work. Code uses virtue ethics and, specifically, virtues of the intellect, to frame an account of moral responsibility that I find interesting, promising, and still relevant to the contemporary revival of virtue ethics and to feminist epistemology more generally.

IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 120 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Kay Nelkin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

Abstract On the one hand, there seem to be compelling parallels to moral responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness in domains other than the moral. For example, we often praise people for their aesthetic and epistemic achievements and blame them for their failures. On the other hand, it has been argued that there is something special about the moral domain, so that at least one robust kind of responsibility can only be found there. In this paper, I argue that we can adopt a unifying framework for locating responsible agency across domains, thereby capturing and explaining more of our actual practices. The key, I argue, is to identify the right conditions for being morally accountable, which I take to be a matter of having an opportunity of a good enough quality to act well. With this account in hand, I argue that we can adopt a unifying framework that allows us to recognize parallels across domains, even as it points the way to important differences among them.

Prejudice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Endre Begby
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Current Concern ◽  
Epistemic Blame ◽  
Ethical Responsibilities

Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense defective? No doubt, many of them will be false. Some will also be harmful. But many philosophers further argue that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by culpably violating our epistemic responsibilities. Moreover, it is assumed that we are morally responsible for the harms that our prejudiced beliefs cause only because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. This book argues that these common convictions are false and misguided. It shows in detail that there can be plenty of epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief. Moreover, it argues that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to give content to ethical responsibilities. In particular, this would unreasonably burden victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, this book develops an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. In support of this view, the book offers a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, it develops a systematic platform for “non-ideal epistemology” which would apply also to a wide range of other socio-epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more.

Is Red Really Romantic?

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 174-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabrielle K. Lehmann ◽  
Robert J. Calin-Jageman
Keyword(s):  
Opposite Direction ◽  
Positive Control ◽  
Weak Effect ◽  
Sample Sizes ◽  
Quality Controls

Abstract. Red has been reported to enhance attraction for women rating men ( Elliot et al., 2010 ) and men rating women ( Elliot & Niesta, 2008 ). We replicated one of these studies online and in-person. To ensure rigor, we obtained original materials, planned for informative sample sizes, pre-registered our study, used a positive control, and adopted quality controls. For men, we found a very weak effect in the predicted direction (d = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.17, 0.34], N = 242). For women, we found a very weak effect in the opposite direction (d = −0.09, 95% CI [−0.30, 0.12], N = 360). The original studies may have overestimated the red effect, our studies may be an underestimate, or there could be strong moderation of the effect of red on attraction.

TELEVISI BESERTA REALITAS NILAI MEDIANYA

DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Social Commitment

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme

Judgments of Moral Responsibility in Tissue Donation Cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Primary Factor ◽  
Tissue Donation ◽  
Potential Donor ◽  
Sperm Donor ◽  
Perceived Burden ◽  
Related Individuals ◽  
Unique Ability

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.

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