Epistemic Responsibility and the Literary Journalist

<p>The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of epistemic responsibility in the practice of book-length literary journalism. Literary journalism offers a powerful alternative to mainstream journalism. Its narrative mode and storytelling techniques open possibilities of representation often closed by traditional reporting practices. Subsequently, literary journalists have attracted criticism for unorthodox modes of representation and attendant “truth claims” in many texts. In this thesis I draw on the work of epistemologist Lorraine Code to highlight the tension between the branches of ethics and epistemology, and argue that holding them apart for the purposes of explication yields important insights into the practice of literary journalism. I argue that criticism of literary journalism has at times conflated ethical and epistemic concerns, resulting in censure of the practitioner on primarily moral grounds. While such a critique is often valid, I propose that it can mislabel problematic cognitive processes as moral deficiencies. A re-examination of significant controversies raised by literary journalism shows disputed areas stemming from epistemic “blind spots”. These “blind spots” are often characterised as ethical lapses, but I argue that framing criticism in this way inhibits progress in sound practice. Recurring controversies over works by practitioners such as Janet Malcolm and Australia’s Helen Garner bear this out. I also offer close readings of three works of contemporary US literary journalism through their paratextual frames. The limits of transparency are demonstrated here, including the fact that disclosure can hide more than it illuminates. Code’s “epistemic responsibilist” approach is subsequently presented as an important addition to literary journalism scholarship, as it offers a sound foundation for reflexive practice—for both writers and critics. Using this approach, I offer critical readings of the “truth claims” in three contemporary US texts: Adrian Nicole LeBlanc’s Random Family (2003), Dave Cullen’s Columbine (2009) and Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010). A secondary aim of this thesis is to characterise contemporary Australian book-length literary journalism. Using Code’s concept of an “epistemic community”, I propose that the nature of national discourse influences the voice of the Australian literary journalist, as revealed by anxiety over representation in the texts under analysis. These texts highlight the pressures of subjectivity on truth, which results in a destabilisation of “truth claims”. In comparison with the US practitioners analysed, their three Australian counterparts analysed place less emphasis on disclosure transparency, and rely more heavily upon self-presentation as seekers, rather than discoverers, of knowledge and truth. I further maintain that these three texts represent a dominant national function of book-length literary journalism. Issues of national identity are bound up in the relationship between the land and its people, and are evident in the work of Margaret Simons, Chloe Hooper and Anna Krien, three of Australia’s most notable literary journalists. Through the lens of a civic dispute, each of these practitioners join one of the most pressing cultural issues in contemporary national discourse, that is, to explore what it means to be “Australian”.</p>

Epistemic Responsibility and the Literary Journalist

<p>The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of epistemic responsibility in the practice of book-length literary journalism. Literary journalism offers a powerful alternative to mainstream journalism. Its narrative mode and storytelling techniques open possibilities of representation often closed by traditional reporting practices. Subsequently, literary journalists have attracted criticism for unorthodox modes of representation and attendant “truth claims” in many texts. In this thesis I draw on the work of epistemologist Lorraine Code to highlight the tension between the branches of ethics and epistemology, and argue that holding them apart for the purposes of explication yields important insights into the practice of literary journalism. I argue that criticism of literary journalism has at times conflated ethical and epistemic concerns, resulting in censure of the practitioner on primarily moral grounds. While such a critique is often valid, I propose that it can mislabel problematic cognitive processes as moral deficiencies. A re-examination of significant controversies raised by literary journalism shows disputed areas stemming from epistemic “blind spots”. These “blind spots” are often characterised as ethical lapses, but I argue that framing criticism in this way inhibits progress in sound practice. Recurring controversies over works by practitioners such as Janet Malcolm and Australia’s Helen Garner bear this out. I also offer close readings of three works of contemporary US literary journalism through their paratextual frames. The limits of transparency are demonstrated here, including the fact that disclosure can hide more than it illuminates. Code’s “epistemic responsibilist” approach is subsequently presented as an important addition to literary journalism scholarship, as it offers a sound foundation for reflexive practice—for both writers and critics. Using this approach, I offer critical readings of the “truth claims” in three contemporary US texts: Adrian Nicole LeBlanc’s Random Family (2003), Dave Cullen’s Columbine (2009) and Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010). A secondary aim of this thesis is to characterise contemporary Australian book-length literary journalism. Using Code’s concept of an “epistemic community”, I propose that the nature of national discourse influences the voice of the Australian literary journalist, as revealed by anxiety over representation in the texts under analysis. These texts highlight the pressures of subjectivity on truth, which results in a destabilisation of “truth claims”. In comparison with the US practitioners analysed, their three Australian counterparts analysed place less emphasis on disclosure transparency, and rely more heavily upon self-presentation as seekers, rather than discoverers, of knowledge and truth. I further maintain that these three texts represent a dominant national function of book-length literary journalism. Issues of national identity are bound up in the relationship between the land and its people, and are evident in the work of Margaret Simons, Chloe Hooper and Anna Krien, three of Australia’s most notable literary journalists. Through the lens of a civic dispute, each of these practitioners join one of the most pressing cultural issues in contemporary national discourse, that is, to explore what it means to be “Australian”.</p>

Norms of assertion in the United States, Germany, and Japan

The recent controversy about misinformation has moved a question into the focus of the public eye that has occupied philosophers for decades: Under what conditions is it appropriate to assert a certain claim? When asserting a claim that x, must one know that x? Must x be true? Might it be normatively acceptable to assert whatever one believes? In the largest cross-cultural study to date (total n = 1,091) on the topic, findings from the United States, Germany, and Japan suggest that, in order to claim that x, x need not be known, and it can be false. However, the data show, we do expect considerable epistemic responsibility on the speaker’s behalf: In order to appropriately assert a claim, the speaker must have good reasons to believe it.

Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothematic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present.

Wrongs, Responsibility, Blame, and Oppression

This chapter addresses the question of moral and epistemic responsibility for intellectual vices and the beliefs that stem from them. It distinguishes three aspects of responsibility: accountability, answerability, and attributability. It argues that people are accountable but not fully answerable for their intellectual vices that are also attributable to them. Nevertheless, the chapter also cautions against blaming (in the sense of resenting) those who are blameworthy because one might lack the standing required to blame others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of taking responsibility for oneself and the importance for self-respect of adopting this stance.

Fake News and Epistemic Rot; or, Why We Are All in This Together

Fake news poses an interesting test case to theories of the epistemology of testimony. If they are to illuminate the nature of the epistemic challenges and harms fake news poses to (members of) a community, the theories themselves must move beyond several overly simplistic models of communication. After developing and criticizing some of these, this chapter goes on to offer a more nearly adequate model. The distinctive feature of the theory presented is that it goes beyond the reporter (speaker) and recipient (hearer), postulating several other roles people (and technology) play in communication. The upshot of these reflections is a case for thinking of epistemic responsibility in distinctly social terms—in terms of what we owe to each other as creatures who are both information-seeking and highly social.