Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception

Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 215-233

Author(s):

Zoe Drayson

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Experience ◽

Naive Realism ◽

Scientific Theories ◽

Naïve Realism ◽

Psychological Theories ◽

Ecological Theories ◽

Metaphysics Of Mind

This paper focuses on two debates: the Metaphysical debate over intentionalism and naïve realism, and the Psychological debate over constructivist and ecological theories. While these two debates are generally assumed to be orthogonal, it is difficult to specify the grounds for this assumption. The chapter considers the usual strategies for distinguishing between philosophical and scientific theories—such as appeals to modal strength, methodology, or explanatory features—and suggests that they do not apply in this case. It argues that both debates rely on inference to the best explanation to draw contingent conclusions about the constitutive nature of perceptual experience. The chapter also claims that the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations will not separate the two debates unless we are already committed to the idea that the metaphysics of mind must be conducted at one particular level of explanation. It concludes that the two debates are engaged in the same general project concerning the nature of perception, and that the Psychological theories are no less metaphysical than the Metaphysical theories.

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Neopragmatism and Philosophy of Perception

Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0006 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 107-126

Author(s):

Joshua Gert

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Experience ◽

Naive Realism ◽

Naïve Realism ◽

Positive View ◽

Sense Data ◽

Philosophy Of Perception ◽

Related Idea ◽

The World ◽

The Mind ◽

Insight Into

Neopragmatism is an anti-metaphysical approach to philosophical problems. It addresses such problems by taking the focus off of metaphysics, and turning it onto language. That is, the neopragmatist seeks philosophically uncontentious explanations of the sort of talk that often gives rise to the sense that there is a deep philosophical puzzle to solve. In the domain of perception, reflection on apt ways of describing perceptual experiences have led to various metaphysically committing theories, including (i) sense data theory, (ii) representationalism, and (iii) naïve realism. This chapter uses neopragmatist techniques to undermine the case for the last of these. The attack is two-pronged. First, some of the metaphysical commitments of naïve realism are criticized. Second, neopragmatism is used to explain some of the ideas that were thought to lend naïve realism support. These include the idea that perceptual experience has a peculiar sort of openness or presentational character, and the related idea that such experience gives insight into the mind-independent character of the world. Beyond forming the basis for criticizing other views, neopragmatism also suggests a positive view of perception. This is a form of adverbialism that relies on the idea that our sensory states are information-bearing, but not, in any robust sense, representational.

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What’s so naïve about naïve realism?

Philosophical Studies ◽

10.1007/s11098-021-01618-z ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Carlo Raineri

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Experience ◽

Perceptual State ◽

Naive Realism ◽

Contemporary Debate ◽

Naïve Realism ◽

Philosophy Of Perception ◽

Key Features

AbstractNaïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put forward as the only view which can take our introspective knowledge of perception at face value, and I identify the two (alleged) key features of such introspective knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that one of these features-namely, that it seems as one could not be in the same perceptual state unless the putative objects of perception existed and were perceived–is introspectively evident. Consequently, I argue that a view of perceptual experience–such as Intentionalism–which denies that this feature is true of perception can still take introspection at face value. This undermines the claim that Naïve Realism is the only account which accommodates our intuitions on the nature of perception.

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