Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Scepticism

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

Moral Error Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
The Relationship

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The moral error theory—i.e. moral judgements attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, and as a consequence those judgements are systematically mistaken—and the argument from analogy—the argument for thinking that morality is systematically mistaken in this way—are introduced. Interest in the argument from analogy is motivated by situating it within recent trends in both moral philosophy and epistemology. A roadmap for the book is provided. The conclusion of the book is outlined: it is that the argument from analogy fails. It is not inferred from this that the moral error theory is true. The arguments do not lead to this conclusion. But the book does claim that—for now at least—we do not know that the argument from analogy is false.

Moral and Epistemic Error Theory

2018 ◽  
pp. 107-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Epistemic Realism ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Facts

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this chapter, it is argued that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.

Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (280) ◽  
pp. 547-569
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Good Case ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Companions In Guilt

Abstract Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons.

scholarly journals Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Wouter Floris Kalf
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

V-Moral Error Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-418
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

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