Prudential Language and Context (II)

This chapter examines whether well-being talk is context-sensitive or pluralistic in a way that undermines theorizing about well-being. It examines recent arguments from Anna Alexandrova (2017) and Stephen Campbell (2016) who claim, respectively, that well-being talk is fundamentally context-sensitive or conceptually pluralistic in a manner hitherto neglected by well-being theorists. The chapter examines the sets of data that they provide. It concedes that some parts of well-being discourse—such as ‘doing well’ claims—are context-sensitive to some degree. However, it rejects the claim that well-being talk is fundamentally context-sensitive, or conceptually pluralistic, in a manner that undermines existing theorizing about well-being.

Prudential Language and Context (I)

This chapter examines evaluative prudential language (good for etc.) and directive prudential language (ought, must, needs etc.) and argues for forms of contextualism about each of these types of language. In the case of ‘good for’ talk, it shows how recent work by Steve Finlay (2014) on the context-sensitivity of ‘good’ supplies a plausible theory of ‘good for’. It then moves on ‘needs’ talk, showing how work on deontic modals from, and inspired by, Angelika Kratzer (1977) can be applied in a way that illuminates how ‘needs’, and the like, function in prudential contexts.

Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

Prudence as a System of Categorical Imperatives

This chapter examines whether there are prudential reasons. After clarifying the nature of prudential reasons (what it would take for there to be such reasons) it examines, and rejects, various positions that entail the denial of the existence of prudential reasons. These include forms of nihilism about prudential value, the view that all reasons are agent-neutral, and (its most pressing opponent) the view that all reasons are Humean, or fundamentally desire-based, in nature. The chapter aims to establish the following thesis: Prudential Value Matters (PVM) — Evaluative prudential facts generate directive prudential facts (including facts about prudential, normative, reasons for action and for attitudes).

Is Prudential Discourse Normative?

This chapter argues for the following thesis—Prudential Judgements are Normative (PJN): Prudential judgements are normative judgements. It begins by distinguishing various ways by which one could argue that prudential judgements are normative. After outlining the weaknesses of these alternative approaches it undertakes a ‘parity strategy’ by assuming that moral judgements are normative and finding a set of relevant features that prudential judgements hold in common with moral judgements, which provide reasons to think that prudential judgements are normative. It then argues against various purported disanalogies between moral and prudential judgements which are designed to undermine the parity strategy and PJN.

Conclusion

This chapter begins by recapitulating the answers given to the main questions pursued in the earlier chapters of book. It then tries to map out some of the issues that are raised but not pursued herein, in order to provide a guide for future inquiry. The first such question is: which meta-prudential view should we adopt? Should we realists, for example, or is some form of anti-realism superior? More generally, is it plausible that the true metaethical view also applies to prudential discourse, so there is one meta-normative theory to rule them all, so to speak? The chapter lays out options and explain some ways in which the foregoing discussion is probative for these debates.

Prudential Normativity

In earlier chapters, it was argued that prudential discourse is normative, like moral discourse. If that is true, then we should expect to be able to take resources from metaethics and fruitfully apply them to meta-prudential questions and vice versa. This chapter tries to do precisely that. In particular, it aims to show how various long-standing debates about prudential value can be enhanced by importing ideas from metaethics and how bringing these two lines of inquiry together generates a number of significant benefits both inside and outside of theorizing about prudential normativity.

Introduction

For as long as I can remember I have held firm views about how people ought to live. Some were moral views. Others were about how people ought to live with respect to themselves and making their own lives go best. Luckily, I stumbled upon the part of philosophy where I could express and defend such views: the theory of well-being or prudential value....

Prudential Judgements and Motivation

In an earlier chapter it was argued that the features of moral judgements which are typically pointed to as explanations of the normativity of moral discourse are also to be found within prudential judgements. One such feature discussed there was the motivational profile of prudential judgements. This chapter explores in detail how prudential judgements are related to motivation. It proceeds by examining a number of possible theses concerning their interrelation, and grounds of these theses. It argues that a small subset of prudential judgements are necessarily connected to motivation in rational agents.