Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Recent Trends ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The moral error theory—i.e. moral judgements attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, and as a consequence those judgements are systematically mistaken—and the argument from analogy—the argument for thinking that morality is systematically mistaken in this way—are introduced. Interest in the argument from analogy is motivated by situating it within recent trends in both moral philosophy and epistemology. A roadmap for the book is provided. The conclusion of the book is outlined: it is that the argument from analogy fails. It is not inferred from this that the moral error theory is true. The arguments do not lead to this conclusion. But the book does claim that—for now at least—we do not know that the argument from analogy is false.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Argument From Analogy ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

The Analogy

2019 ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Scepticism

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

Moral Error Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
The Relationship

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

scholarly journals Morality and Epistemic Judgement

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

scholarly journals Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Wouter Floris Kalf
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

V-Moral Error Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-418
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

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