Principles of epistemic logic II: Being in a position to know

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic

Principles of being in a position to know that are candidates for inclusion in a combined logic for knowledge and being in a position to know are critically reviewed. Some are disqualified for reasons similar to those that already disqualified their counterparts for knowledge, others for other reasons, since being in a position to know, unlike knowledge, does not imply belief. Of those that survive closer scrutiny, some are restricted versions of more general principles that ought to be rejected. Two unfamiliar principles are singled out and given a detailed defence. Since one of them affirms outright that some non-trivial condition is luminous, its defence involves demonstration that, at least for this isolated case, the anti-luminosity argument devised in Williamson (2000) can be resisted. Throughout, and in line with the results of chapters 2 and 3, it is being assumed that knowledge requires safe belief, and correspondingly, that being in a position to know requires being in a position to safely believe.

Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1059-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Artemov ◽  
Elena Nogina
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic

INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Topo-Logic as a Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

2017 ◽  
pp. 330-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic

EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND INFORMATION UPDATE

2008 ◽  
pp. 361-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Hans P. van Ditmarsch ◽  
Lawrence S. Moss
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Information Update

“What makes a reasoning sound” is the proof of its truth: A reconstruction of Peirce’s semiotics as epistemic logic, and why he did not complete his realistic revolution

Semiotica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (221) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Dan Nesher
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Inductive Logic ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Perceptual Judgment ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Complete Proof ◽  
Abductive Logic ◽  
Pure Mathematics ◽  
True Representation ◽  
Logic Of Evaluation

AbstractCharles S. Peirce attempted to develop his semiotic theory of cognitive signs interpretation, which are originated in our basic perceptual operations that quasi-prove the truth of perceptual judgment representing reality. The essential problem was to explain how, by a cognitive interpretation of the sequence of perceptual signs, we can represent external physical reality and reflectively represent our cognitive mind’s operations of signs. With his phaneroscopy introspection, Peirce shows how, without going outside our cognitions, we can represent external reality. Hence Peirce can avoid the Berkeleyian, Humean, and Kantian phenomenologies, as well as the modern analytic philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology. Peirce showed that with the trio of semiotic interpretation – abductive logic of discovery of hypotheses, deductive logic of necessary inference, and inductive logic of evaluation – we can reach a complete proof of the true representation of reality. This semiotic logic of reasoning is the epistemic logic representing human confrontation in reality, with which we can achieve knowledge and conduct our behavior. However, Peirce did not complete his realistic revolution to eliminate previously accepted nominalistic and idealistic epistemologies of formal logic and pure mathematics. Here, I inquire why Peirce did not complete his historical realist epistemological revolution and following that inquiry I attempt to reconstruct it.

scholarly journals The Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Actual Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Logical Omniscience ◽  
Actual Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Change ◽  
The Past ◽  
Knowledge Models ◽  
Complete Axiomatization ◽  
New Information

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.

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