complete axiomatization
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Author(s):  
Alexander Belikov ◽  
Dmitry Zaitsev

The relationship between formal (standard) logic and informal (common-sense, everyday) reasoning has always been a hot topic. In this paper, we propose another possible way to bring it up inspired by connexive logic. Our approach is based on the following presupposition: whatever method of formalizing informal reasoning you choose, there will always be some classically acceptable deductive principles that will have to be abandoned, and some desired schemes of argument that clearly are not classically valid. That way, we start with a new version of connexive logic which validates Boethius' (and thus, Aristotle's) Theses and quashes their converse from right to left. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic. We also study the implication-negation fragment of this logic supplied with Boolean negation as a second negation.



2021 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Satoru Niki ◽  
Hitoshi Omori

We investigate an expansion of positive intuitionistic logic obtained by adding a constant Ω introduced by Lloyd Humberstone. Our main results include a sound and strongly complete axiomatization, some comparisons to other expansions of intuitionistic logic obtained by adding actuality and empirical negation, and an algebraic semantics. We also brie y discuss its connection to classical logic.



2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Fan

Abstract Inspired by an interesting quotation from the literature, we propose four modalities, called ‘sane belief’, ‘insane belief’, ‘reliable belief’ and ‘unreliable belief’, and introduce logics with each operator as the modal primitive. We show that the four modalities constitute a square of opposition, which indicates some interesting relationships among them. We compare the relative expressivity of these logics and other related logics, including a logic of false beliefs from the literature. The four main logics are all less expressive than the standard modal logic over various model classes, and the logics of sane and insane beliefs are, respectively, equally expressive as the logics of unreliable and reliable beliefs on any class of models. The logics of reliable and unreliable beliefs are then combined into a bimodal logic, which turns out to be equally expressive as the standard modal logic. Despite this, we cannot obtain a complete axiomatization of the minimal bimodal logic, by simply translating the axioms and rules of the minimal modal logic $\textbf{K}$ into the bimodal language. We then introduce a schematic modality which unifies reliable and unreliable beliefs and axiomatize it over the class of all frames and also the class of serial frames. This line of research is finally extended to unify sane and insane beliefs and some axiomatizations are given.



2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgi Japaridze

Abstract Cirquent calculus is a novel proof theory permitting component-sharing between logical expressions. Using it, the predecessor article ‘Elementary-base cirquent calculus I: Parallel and choice connectives’ built the sound and complete axiomatization $\textbf{CL16}$ of a propositional fragment of computability logic. The atoms of the language of $\textbf{CL16}$ represent elementary, i.e. moveless, games and the logical vocabulary consists of negation, parallel connectives and choice connectives. The present paper constructs the first-order version $\textbf{CL17}$ of $\textbf{CL16}$, also enjoying soundness and completeness. The language of $\textbf{CL17}$ augments that of $\textbf{CL16}$ by including choice quantifiers. Unlike classical predicate calculus, $\textbf{CL17}$ turns out to be decidable.



2020 ◽  
Vol 819 ◽  
pp. 50-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinfeng Shu ◽  
Zhenhua Duan ◽  
Hongwei Du


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3-5) ◽  
pp. 689-725
Author(s):  
Mathias Claus Jensen ◽  
Kim Guldstrand Larsen


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.



2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 748-775
Author(s):  
ADAM BJORNDAHL ◽  
AYBÜKE ÖZGÜN

AbstractIn recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge 35. Building on Stalnaker’s core insights, and using frameworks developed in 11 and 3, we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker’s system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an “evidence-in-hand” conception of knowledge and a weaker “evidence-out-there” notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker’s postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.



2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 803-830 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojan MarinkoviĆ ◽  
Paola Glavan ◽  
Zoran OgnjanoviĆ ◽  
Thomas Studer

Abstract In this paper we provide a strongly complete axiomatization of a temporal epistemic logic in which non-rigid sets of agents are allowed. Using this framework, we prove a number of properties of the blockchain protocol with respect to the given set of axioms and premises.



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