The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Husak
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Act Requirement

Moral and Ascriptive Responsibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
A P Simester
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Act Requirement

This chapter sets out in more detail two concepts of responsibility, “moral” and “ascriptive”, as they are used in this book. Moral responsibility is concerned with a defendant’s eligibility for moral praise or blame in respect of her behaviour. Ascriptive responsibility, by contrast is concerned with the conditions of accountability. The latter is audience-relative: the former is not. Within the criminal law, denials of moral responsibility are accommodated through defences such as infancy and insanity, and by the requirement of voluntariness. Denials of ascription, by contrast, turn primarily upon doctrines of causation, omissions, and complicity. The chapter concludes with a critique of the so-called voluntary act requirement.

2. Actus Reus: The Conduct Element

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Central Aspect ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Act Requirement

The actus reus is a central aspect of criminal law that defines the harm done to the victim and the wrong performed by the defendant. In many cases this involves proof that the defendant caused a particular result. This chapter begins by distinguishing the component elements of a crime. It then discusses the voluntary act ‘requirement’; causation; classification of offences; the need for a voluntary act; omissions; and seeking a coherent approach to causation.

Rape Law Commonalities

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Stuart P. Green
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Assault ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Sexual Contact ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Rape Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Act Requirement

This chapter focuses on a range of issues common to all six of the rape paradigms that are described in subsequent chapters. It begins with a brief historical overview of rape law, observing a significant expansion in the definition of rape and sexual assault along two axes, namely, the kinds of sexual contact covered and the means by which nonconsent is manifested. It then considers the disparate ways in which the labels rape and sexual assault have been used, and makes an argument for retaining the term rape in the criminal law. Next, it considers how the physical act requirement in rape and sexual assault has been defined in a range of criminal codes, finally touching on some of the challenges of offense grading.

2. Actus Reus: The Conduct Element

Criminal Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 66-128
Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Central Aspect ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Act Requirement

The actus reus is a central aspect of criminal law that defines the harm done to the victim and the wrong performed by the defendant. In many cases this involves proof that the defendant caused a particular result. This chapter begins by distinguishing the component elements of a crime. It then discusses the voluntary act ‘requirement’; causation; classification of offences; the need for a voluntary act; omissions; and seeking a coherent approach to causation.

5. Criminal conduct: actus reus, causation, and permissions

2019 ◽  
pp. 98-155
Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
General Part ◽  
The Law ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Mere Possession ◽  
Criminal Conduct ◽  
Act Requirement

This chapter focuses on the ‘general part’ of the criminal law—the rules and principles of the criminal law whose importance and application can be analysed and debated without necessarily referring to a specific crime. It first examines the limits of the notion of involuntary conduct. It then looks at various challenges to the ‘voluntary act’ requirement—where is the act if the law criminalizes the occurrence of a state of affairs, or mere possession? Next, it considers how the voluntary act requirement relates to crimes of omission. This is followed by discussions of causation and the circumstances in which conduct may be recognized as justifiable.

Action, the Act Requirement and Criminal Liability

2004 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 69-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antony Duff
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Act Requirement

The slogan that criminal liability requires an ‘act’, or a ‘voluntary act’, is still something of a commonplace in textbooks of criminal law. There are, it is usually added, certain exceptions to this requirement— cases in which liability is in fact, and perhaps even properly, imposed in the absence of such an act: but the ‘act requirement’ is taken to represent a normally minimal necessary condition of criminal liability. Even offences of strict liability, for which no mens rea is required, require an act: thus to the familiar slogan that actus non facit reum nisi metis sit rea we can add the prior, more fundamental slogan that mens non facit reum nisi actus sit reus; before we ask whether a defendant acted with mens rea or fault, we must ask whether he committed a criminal act at all.

scholarly journals Defense of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law from Philosophies of Action

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-470
Author(s):  
J.J. Child
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
General Definition ◽  
Abstract Principle ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Act Requirement

When looking to identify the basic ingredients of criminal responsibility, reference is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what she has done or (perhaps) failed to do where such doing or failing to do is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or character. However, despite the continued appeal of the VAR in abstract principle, the precise definitions and restrictions entailed within it are not always clear, and its usefulness in preventing inappropriate criminalization is openly (and in many cases correctly) challenged. Principally, and crucially, the VAR has received sustained attack in recent years from critics within the philosophies of action, highlighting its descriptive and normative shortcomings. It is contended that such criticism is misplaced. This article provides defense to a stripped-back definition of the VAR, distinguishing the general definition of action in philosophy from the definition of action within the criminal law, and seeking to identify and preserve a doctrinally workable model of the latter.

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