Criminological analysis of determinants of criminal behavior

This article analyzes the process of determination of criminal conduct. The authors argue that the reasons for criminal conduct are individual and can vary significantly on a case-by-case basis. Its dependence on both biological and social factors is stated. The combination of pathological heredity, social environment, political and economic factors can cause criminal behavior. At the same time, the psychological aspects of illegal acts are taken into account within almost all criminological theories to a greater or lesser extent. Criminal behavior is always demonstrated only by an individual and, above all, it is a manifestation of psychological deformities, expressed in the phenomenon of criminogenic contamination. Therefore, understanding its essence will better determine the nature of the warning influence. As a result, it is possible to answer several questions about the determination and nature of criminal behavior, the reasons for the commission of criminal offenses, the peculiarities of the functioning of the mental sphere, psychological problems, complexes, etc. This information helps to optimize methods of crime prevention, provide for further actions of serial criminals, help in the identification of offenders and the investigation of criminal cases.

Risky Business: Evaluating the Dynamic Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry for Use with New Zealand Youth

<p>An important assumption that decisions based on criminal risk assessments rely on is that our assessments of someone’s likelihood of reoffending are accurate. It is well known that young people share many risk factors for criminal conduct with adults, but there is also research to suggest that some factors may be more important at different ages. This research examined how well an adult dynamic risk assessment tool, The Dynamic Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry (DRAOR), was able to predict any new criminal conviction as well as any new violent conviction in a sample of New Zealand youth (17-19 years) serving community supervision sentences. It was found that DRAOR scores were moderately strong predictors of future criminal conduct for youth, with better results being found for any reconvictions compared to violent reconvictions. The more recent an assessment was, the more accurate it was too. It was also found that those who did not go on to be reconvicted showed greater improvements on the risk scale throughout the course of their sentence than those who were reconvicted. These findings support the continued use of the DRAOR for youth in New Zealand who are serving community supervision sentences.</p>

Risky Business: Evaluating the Dynamic Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry for Use with New Zealand Youth

<p>An important assumption that decisions based on criminal risk assessments rely on is that our assessments of someone’s likelihood of reoffending are accurate. It is well known that young people share many risk factors for criminal conduct with adults, but there is also research to suggest that some factors may be more important at different ages. This research examined how well an adult dynamic risk assessment tool, The Dynamic Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry (DRAOR), was able to predict any new criminal conviction as well as any new violent conviction in a sample of New Zealand youth (17-19 years) serving community supervision sentences. It was found that DRAOR scores were moderately strong predictors of future criminal conduct for youth, with better results being found for any reconvictions compared to violent reconvictions. The more recent an assessment was, the more accurate it was too. It was also found that those who did not go on to be reconvicted showed greater improvements on the risk scale throughout the course of their sentence than those who were reconvicted. These findings support the continued use of the DRAOR for youth in New Zealand who are serving community supervision sentences.</p>

Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

Responsible publication of criminal accusations in New Zealand – the case for change

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>

At What Price? Managing the Costs of Tolerating Corrupt or Criminal Partners in Stability Interventions

States or coalitions may conduct intervention operations to stabilise weak or failing states. Intervening powers often use military or police forces to impose security while development agencies rebuild the affected state’s institutions, including the Rule of Law. However, recent experience suggests that interventions may perpetuate criminal conduct. This paper examines the NATO missions in Afghanistan and other interventions to suggest links between partnering with corrupt or criminal actors and subsequent setbacks in stabilisation. It then proposes strategies by which future intervention forces may mitigate the risks of perpetuating criminal conduct. The paper asserts that intervention forces may empower criminal actors inadvertently or deliberately. It suggests that criminal allies may offer apparent security gains, and command popular support; and may be the only allies available. However, it concludes that perpetuating crime and corruption undermines the legitimacy of the affected state’s government and the intervention force, and potentially enables state capture. These outcomes may perpetuate violence. The paper suggests that intervention forces may mitigate these risks by setting clear priorities, planning against all potential threats including organised criminals, linking aid to the achievement of governance objectives, delaying transition until the affected state’s institutions are ready, and conducting deep selection of future leaders.

Crack 2.0

The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act charged the U.S. Sentencing Commission with developing sentencing guidelines that advanced the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). After the Supreme Court cases Booker, Kimbrough, Gall, and Spears, it is now well established—at least with federal drug trafficking offenses—that the Commission did not fulfill that directive. The magnitude of that failure (coupled with some of Congress’s own misguided decisions) has previously been highlighted by the evolution of federal crack sentencing policies, the Fair Sentencing Act, the related line of Supreme Court cases, and more recently the First Step Act. Congress’s compromise correction of over twenty years (essentially a generation) of a failed war on crack did nothing to further correct similar defects with federal drug sentencing policies for other controlled substances—particularly with respect to methamphetamine. Given the resurgence of methamphetamine trafficking, use, and prosecutions, this paper will analyze post-1988 federal methamphetamine sentencing policy to illustrate how the drug-type, quantity, and purity model for punishing drug trafficking offenses still produces unwarranted sentencing disparities between similar controlled substances or different forms of the same controlled substances—and in the end plainly fails to effectively deter the targeted criminal conduct or advance the purposes of federal sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).