Games Played on Networks

2016 ◽  
pp. 82-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Bramoullé ◽  
Rachel Kranton
Keyword(s):  
Technology Adoption ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Peer Effects ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Largest Eigenvalue ◽  
Common Framework ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common

This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings, including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The chapter establishes a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. The authors review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. The chapter discusses the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including Bonacich centrality and the lowest and largest eigenvalue. The text discusses the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network and develops a new notion—interdependence—to analyze how a shock to one agent affects the action of another agent.

Equilibrium and efficient provision of local public goods with peer effects

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Epple ◽  
Richard Romano
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Peer Effects ◽  
Local Public Goods

Voluntary Cooperation in Local Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Werner GGth ◽  
Francesca Marazzi ◽  
Luca Panaccione
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

Public Service, Public Goods, and the Common Good

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appointed Officials

The proper provision of public goods by a well-functioning, impartial government is not the only thing necessary for attaining the common good, but it is essential. The economic view of the human person as a rational, self-interested maximizer has become pervasive in analyzing government dysfunction and is employed by international agencies to generate proposals to realign the economic incentives of government officials. But this mindset assumes and encourages self-interest and undermines idoneidad (suitability)—which includes integrity, motivation, and competence—as the most fundamental characteristic that must be demanded of both elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. The failure of public institutions in Argentina is employed as a telling example of such problems.

scholarly journals Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (103) ◽  
pp. 20141203 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Tom Lenaerts
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Full Agreement ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strategic Solution

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

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