Ecology of the digital world of Wikipedia

Wikipedia, a paradigmatic example of online knowledge space is organized in a collaborative, bottom-up way with voluntary contributions, yet it maintains a level of reliability comparable to that of traditional encyclopedias. The lack of selected professional writers and editors makes the judgement about quality and trustworthiness of the articles a real challenge. Here we show that a self-consistent metrics for the network defined by the edit records captures well the character of editors’ activity and the articles’ level of complexity. Using our metrics, one can better identify the human-labeled high-quality articles, e.g., “featured” ones, and differentiate them from the popular and controversial articles. Furthermore, the dynamics of the editor-article system is also well captured by the metrics, revealing the evolutionary pathways of articles and diverse roles of editors. We demonstrate that the collective effort of the editors indeed drives to the direction of article improvement.

Charity auctions from an economic perspective — literature review

One of the most common means of raising funds is the charity auction. At charity auctions, money is collected for a good cause, and the products are purchased for private consumption — the bidders may achieve both public and private gains. The charitable nature of this type of auction makes them different from standard auctions. The paper aims to present the main characteristics of this fundraising strategy as well as make a comparison with other formats of raising money for a good cause, i.a. lotteries. Furthermore, the main differences between charity and non-charity auctions will be explained. The studies do not clearly demonstrate whether the charity auction is a more effective mechanism of raising funds than the lottery. However, there is evidence that both formats outperform voluntary contributions. From the perspective of charity organizations, the most effective charity auction format seems to be the all-pay auction. The studies have also revealed that revenues at charity auctions are higher than at standard auctions.

Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from each dollar that is contributed, is held constant. Moreover, the efficiency gains from the punishment mechanism are significantly higher in the 40-participant than in the four-participant treatment. This is true despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. It reflects increased per capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return (MGR), i.e. the return to the entire group of participants, stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good. Efficiency is not significantly different from the small-group treatment.

Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from each dollar that is contributed, is held constant. Moreover, the efficiency gains from the punishment mechanism are significantly higher in the 40-participant than in the four-participant treatment. This is true despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. It reflects increased per capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return (MGR), i.e. the return to the entire group of participants, stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good. Efficiency is not significantly different from the small-group treatment.

Part II Sources, Ch.10 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

This chapter addresses the role played by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the making and implementation of international refugee law. It begins by considering UNHCR’s mandate responsibilities and operational functions to better understand the structures that condition the scope of UNHCR’s engagement with the functioning of international law. While UNHCR’s 1950 Statute and the Refugee Convention both mandate UNHCR to serve particular functions, such as its supervisory responsibility relating to the Refugee Convention, its Statute also places particular constraints on UNHCR, especially in terms of the scope of its activities and its reliance on voluntary contributions from States to perform its mandated functions. The chapter then looks at how the roles UNHCR has played in the making and implementation of refugee law at the global, regional, and national levels, through its operations, and how these functions have evolved over time. By illustrating the various instances where UNHCR has demonstrated power, along with those instances where UNHCR has exhibited pathologies and has been constrained by the interests of States, the chapter points to the importance of understanding international refugee law within the political environment in which it functions.

The Role of Cultural Capital on the Voluntary Contributions to Cultural Goods: A Differential Game Approach

This study aims to offer a formal analysis which relates provision of cultural goods to the society’s level of cultural capital. Such a level is assumed to already exist in society and is increasable thanks to individual support for the offer of cultural goods. The achievement of the highest levels of cultural capital increases satisfaction coming from cultural goods consumption, and then voluntary contributions. Social approval, deriving from donations, is positively related to society’s existing cultural capital and triggers a positive externality for donators, thus increasing contributions and generating a positive externality for the whole society. The dynamic analysis provided in this study requires the adoption of a differential game where individuals interact, making their choices on their voluntary contribution level. We find that, under certain conditions, the solution obtained for the Nash equilibrium with closed-loop strategies provides optimal level of cultural capital that exceed the Pareto efficient solution obtained through open-loop strategies.