Question-Order Effects of Presidential Approval Ratings on Gubernatorial Approval Ratings: A Research Note

Social Forces ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1241-1248 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. E. Alspach ◽  
G. F. Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Research Note ◽  
Order Effects ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Question Order ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings

The Effects of the State of Union Address of USA Presidents to Their Performance Ratings

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Carl Lee
Keyword(s):  
Text Mining ◽  
Performance Ratings ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Mining Technique ◽  
State Of The Union ◽  
Speech Patterns ◽  
Modeling Techniques ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings

In this article, the authors conduct a case study using text mining technique to analyze the patterns of the president's State of the Union Address in USA, and investigate the effects of these speech patterns on their performance rating in the following year. The speeches analyzed include the recent four USA presidents, Bush (1989 – 1992), Clinton (1993 - 2000), G.W. Bush (2001 – 2008), and Obama (2009 – 2011). The patterns found are further integrated and merged with over 4000 surveys on the presidents' performance ratings from 1989 to 2010. Two text mining methodology are applied to study the text patterns. Two predictive modeling techniques are applied to study the effects of these found patterns to their presidential approval ratings. The results indicate that the speech patterns found are highly associated with their approval rates.

scholarly journals Oito anos construindo popularidade

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Luiz Ferreira ◽  
Sergio Naruhiko Sakurai ◽  
Rodolfo Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Macroeconomic Indicators ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings

Este artigo apresenta uma breve resenha e discute alguns dos resultados apresentados no trabalho de Ferreira, A. L. & Sakurai, S. N. (2010), “Personal Charisma or the Economy? Macroeconomic indicators of presidential approval ratings in Brazil”. A evidência encontrada numa versão atualizada desse artigo, referente ao período entre 09/1999 e 05/2010, mostra que o desemprego é uma das principais variáveis econômicas que afetam a aprovação. Também existe evidência de que o atual presidente apresenta uma taxa de aprovação maior que a do presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), mantendo constante importantes indicadores macroeconômicos domésticos e estrangeiros. No entanto, o período de 09/99 até 12/2002 é caracterizado por uma tendência determinista positiva maior do que a do período anterior, indicando um diferencial de crescimento contínuo da popularidade de FHC.

The de-emphasis of sampling error in coverage of presidential approval ratings

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-190
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Reavy ◽  
Kimberly Pavlick
Keyword(s):  
Sampling Error ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings

This study extends research into problems in handling sampling error within polls by examining coverage of President Obama’s approval ratings in three major newspapers over a five-year period. Results indicate support for hypotheses suggesting that, when confronted with poll results that could be explained by sampling error alone, journalists will instead emphasize those changes or differences.

Question Wording and Macropartisanship

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael B. MacKuen ◽  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
James A. Stimson ◽  
Paul R. Abramson ◽  
Charles W. Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York Times ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Telephone Surveys ◽  
Gallup Poll ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings ◽  
Poll Data

MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson used quarterly Gallup poll data to show in this Review in 1989 that changing levels of macropartisanship, the two-party division of partisans, responded to presidential approval ratings and perceptions of the economy and predicted national election results. In a 1991 Review research note Abramson and Ostrom argued that the NES and GSS questions more commonly used by scholars generated macropartisanship measures less sensitive to short term factors and less predictive of election outcomes. In this Controversy, Erikson and Stimson respond to the challenge and present new data from CBS News and New York Times telephone surveys to buttress their earlier analyses, arguing against substantial effects of the different question wordings. Abramson and Ostrom explain their continuing reservations.

scholarly journals Terrorist Attacks & Presidential Approval Rating

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Political Affiliation ◽  
September 11Th ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Approval Rating ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Over Time

After the attacks of September 11th the U.S. focused much of its foreign policy efforts on the War on Terror and prevention of another attack on U.S. soil. This paper will look at terrorist attacks dating back to 1970 in order to fully understand the impact of terrorist attacks on U.S. presidential approval ratings and the existence of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect during different administrations. Location, lethality, style, and political affiliation of the president will be variables focused on in a pre and post 9/11 context. This paper will give special consideration to 9/11, excluding the attacks in many cases, in order to view if there is a significant stable impact on approval ratings from terrorist attacks over time.

Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984–2016

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Predictor Of Success ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Presidential Approval Ratings ◽  
Late Twentieth Century ◽  
Better Than

AbstractSince the late twentieth century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to relax presidential term limits, often successfully. This article discusses the conditions under which countries succeed in relaxing term limits. Drawing from bargaining models and reviewing 36 cases, it makes three arguments. First, actors' preferences are fairly predictable on the basis of officeholding: presidents are the most prominent actors pushing for expansion of term limits; opposition parties lead the resistance. Second, power asymmetry, measured by presidential approval ratings, is the best predictor of success, better than ideology or share of seats in Congress. Third, the only hope for stopping popular presidents rests with ruling parties and the courts, but only when the latter are sufficiently independent.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document