Trust in Latin American Governing Institutions

The end of dictatorships, civil wars, and exclusive party systems by the close of the 20th century was a genuine cause for optimism about democracy in Latin America. Once the euphoria surrounding transitions subsided, the cold realities of transitioning to open market economies thrust the region into a crisis of representation. That is, Latin America’s parties, elected officials, and voters struggled mightily to achieve the democratic ideals of representation, accountability, effective citizenship rights, and rule of law (inter alia, Frances Hagopian’s “After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation and the Democratic Future of South America”; Jorge Domínguez’s “Latin America’s Crisis of Representation”; Kenneth M. Roberts’s “Party-Society Linkages and Democratic Representation in Latin America”; Scott Mainwaring’s “The Crisis of Representation in the Andes”). In many Latin American countries, a general malaise set in that bubbled over (again) with protests in 2019. COVID-19’s global pandemic placed a temporary lid on this simmering situation but likely exacerbated the region’s crisis of representation. Viewed as a barometer for democratic viability, political trust has become a lynchpin among institutional, behavioral, and cultural theories of democratization. Though “political trust” could refer to myriad institutions, we conceptually circumscribe it to governments, legislatures, political parties, local government, the judiciary, the police, the military, and the civil service / bureaucracy. We acknowledge that a research tradition built on David Easton’s conception of political system support (A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 1965; “A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” 1975) views presidential approval and satisfaction with democracy as conceptually kindred to political trust. We nevertheless distinguish these concepts because satisfaction with democracy remains in conceptual and empirical limbo after decades of debate. Moreover, early-21st-century work from the Executive Approval Project and others diverges theoretically from political trust by considering characteristics (e.g., gender, ideology) and actions (e.g., scandals, executive decrees) of a single person, the president, as opposed to institutions more broadly. We also acknowledge the tradition of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963), which analyzes interpersonal trust alongside political trust. Research on interpersonal trust in the region has, unfortunately, lagged behind research on political trust and, if anything, has hewn more closely to the multidisciplinary work on prosociality than the culturalist tradition. In sum, interpersonal trust, presidential approval, and support for and satisfaction with democracy arise in the works cited in this article. But we view them as conceptually distinct from political trust and judge the scholarly advances related to the latter as worthy of separate treatment. Scholars have invested vast resources into measuring political trust, theorizing its drivers, and modeling its implications. This article explores advances on those three fronts. Along the way it highlights major breakthroughs and unresolved questions.

Individual Differences in Belief in Fake News about Election Fraud after the 2020 U.S. Election

Fake news is a serious problem because it misinforms people about important issues. The present study examined belief in false headlines about election fraud after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Belief in election fraud had dangerous consequences, including the deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. In the present study, participants rated the truthfulness of true and false headlines about the election, and then completed individual difference measures eight days after the election. Participants with more conservative ideology, greater presidential approval of the outgoing president, greater endorsement of general conspiracy narratives and poorer cognitive reflection demonstrated greater belief in false headlines about election fraud. Additionally, consuming more politically conservative election news was associated with greater belief in false headlines. Identifying the factors related to susceptibility to false claims of election fraud offers a path toward countering the influence of these claims by tailoring interventions aimed at decreasing belief in misinformation and decreasing conspiracy beliefs to those most susceptible.

Explaining Presidential Approval, 1993-2020: An Examination of the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump Presidencies

Can public support for recent presidents be explained by long-held findings in the presidential approval literature? The presidencies, of Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump seem to counter the existing literature, suggesting that recent approval ratings have become disconnected from the political environment. We synthesize prior scholarship on the environmental connection, salience, and economic handling to develop a general model to evaluate approval during the 1992-2020 period. The model estimates show the environmental connection remains intact. Looking at these four presidents together, we find the public punished and rewarded presidents in a manner consistent with the long-held findings of the literature. Even though each of these four presidents served in unique circumstances, the foundation of the public’s approval remained consistent. Our results point to an enduring environmental connection that holds presidents accountable for the conditions of the day.

Explaining Presidential Approval, 1993-2020: An Examination of the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump Presidencies

Can public support for recent presidents be explained by long-held findings in the presidential approval literature? The presidencies, of Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump seem to counter the existing literature, suggesting that recent approval ratings have become disconnected from the political environment. We synthesize prior scholarship on the environmental connection, salience, and economic handling to develop a general model to evaluate approval during the 1992-2020 period. The model estimates show the environmental connection remains intact. Looking at these four presidents together, we find the public punished and rewarded presidents in a manner consistent with the long-held findings of the literature. Even though each of these four presidents served in unique circumstances, the foundation of the public’s approval remained consistent. Our results point to an enduring environmental connection that holds presidents accountable for the conditions of the day.

Unpacking Presidential Satisfaction: Preliminary Insights from Survey Data on the Bottom Poor in Metro Manila

Measures of presidential satisfaction have long been in the public’s attention, but the factors that drive them have brought about much discussion. As a contribution to the literature, this study empirically examines presidential approval data in the Philippines using a unique survey of 1200 low-income voting age residents of Metro Manila. Using individual-level data, this study unpacks the possible factors underpinning survey results on citizens’ satisfaction with leadership in the Philippines. While accounting for the personal circumstances of the respondents, this study finds evidence of bandwagoning among survey respondents; and partial evidence of personal economic conditions and disinformation possibly linked to presidential satisfaction. The findings here suggest there should be more caution in interpreting presidential satisfaction indicators.

When growth is not enough: inequality, economic gains, and executive approval

A robust economy is assumed to bolster leaders' standing. This ignores how benefits of growth are distributed. Extending the partisan models of economic voting, we theorize executives are more likely rewarded when gains from growth go to their constituents. Analyses of presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries support our pro-constituency model of accountability. When economic inequality is high, growth concentrates among the rich, and approval of right-of-center presidents is higher. Leftist presidents benefit from growth when gains are more equally distributed. Further analyses show growth and inequality inform perceptions of personal finances differently based on wealth, providing a micro-mechanism behind the aggregate findings. Study results imply that the economy is not purely a valence issue, but also a position issue.

Biden Administration Relies on Constitutional Authority and Unwilling or Unable Theory of Self-Defense for Airstrikes in Syria

On February 25, 2021, the United States conducted a strike targeting Iranian-backed militia group facilities in Syria. The strike, which came in response to a February 15, 2021 attack on U.S. interests in Iraq, marked the Biden administration's first known exercise of executive war powers. As domestic authority for the strike, President Joseph Biden, Jr. cited his authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and did not rely on the 2001 or 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). For international legal authority, Biden relied on individual self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, stating that Syria was “unwilling or unable” to prevent further attacks on the United States by these non-state actors within its territory. The strikes garnered mixed reactions from Congress, where efforts are underway to repeal or reform extant AUMFs as well as the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The Biden administration is also undertaking a review of current U.S. military policy on the use of force, and during this process, it has prohibited drone strikes outside of conventional battlefields, absent presidential approval.

The early COVID-19 pandemic and democratic attitudes

How does a public health crisis like a global pandemic affect political opinions in fragile democratic contexts? Research in political science suggests several possible public reactions to crisis, from retrospective anti-incumbency to rally ‘round the flag effects to democratic erosion and authoritarianism. Which of these obtains depends on the nature of the crisis. We examine whether and how the onset of the global pandemic shifted public opinion toward the president, elections, and democracy in Haiti. We embedded two experiments in a phone survey administered to a nationally representative sample of Haitians in April-June 2020. We find that the early pandemic boosted presidential approval and intentions to vote for the incumbent president, consistent with a rally effect. These results show that a rally effect occurs even in the most unlikely of places–an unstable context in which the incumbent president is struggling to maintain order and support. At the same time, we find scant evidence that the onset of the pandemic eroded democratic attitudes, even in a context in which democracy rests on uncertain grounds.