Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one’s death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life. Summary: Recent cases and discussion have raised questions about whether brain death criteria successfully capture natural death. These questions are especially troubling since vital organs are often retrieved from individuals declared dead by brain death criteria. We therefore seem to be left with a choice: either salvage brain death criteria or else abandon current organ donation practices. In this article, we present a different way forward. In particular, we defend a view we call Double Effect Donation, according to which it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. Double Effect Donation, we argue, is not merely compatible with but grows out of a view that acknowledges the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.
Evaluating the Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Organ Donation and Transplantation Activities in Iran
