scholarly journals Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Georg Nöldeke
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Biased Sampling ◽  
Multiplayer Games ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Group Size Distribution

AbstractModels of the evolution of collective action typically assume that interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, social interactions between animals occur in groups of widely dispersed size. This article models collective action problems as two-strategy multiplayer games and studies the effect of variability in group size on the evolution of cooperative behavior under the replicator dynamics. The analysis identifies elementary conditions on the payoff structure of the game implying that the evolution of cooperative behavior is promoted or inhibited when the group size experienced by a focal player is more or less variable. Similar but more stringent conditions are applicable when the confounding effect of size-biased sampling, which causes the group-size distribution experienced by a focal player to differ from the statistical distribution of group sizes, is taken into account.

scholarly journals Group augmentation, collective action, and territorial boundary patrols by male chimpanzees

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (28) ◽  
pp. 7337-7342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin E. Langergraber ◽  
David P. Watts ◽  
Linda Vigilant ◽  
John C. Mitani
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Dominance Rank ◽  
Primate Species ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
High Dominance ◽  
Participation Costs ◽  
Low Costs

How can collective action evolve when individuals benefit from cooperation regardless of whether they pay its participation costs? According to one influential perspective, collective action problems are common, especially when groups are large, but may be solved when individuals who have more to gain from the collective good or can produce it at low costs provide it to others as a byproduct. Several results from a 20-y study of one of the most striking examples of collective action in nonhuman animals, territorial boundary patrolling by male chimpanzees, are consistent with these ideas. Individuals were more likely to patrol when (i) they had more to gain because they had many offspring in the group; (ii) they incurred relatively low costs because of their high dominance rank and superior physical condition; and (iii) the group size was relatively small. However, several other findings were better explained by group augmentation theory, which proposes that individuals should bear the short-term costs of collective action even when they have little to gain immediately if such action leads to increases in group size and long-term increases in reproductive success. In support of this theory, (i) individual patrolling effort was higher and less variable than participation in intergroup aggression in other primate species; (ii) males often patrolled when they had no offspring or maternal relatives in the group; and (iii) the aggregate patrolling effort of the group did not decrease with group size. We propose that group augmentation theory deserves more consideration in research on collective action.

scholarly journals How chimpanzees solve collective action problems

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1749) ◽  
pp. 4946-4954 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Claire Schneider ◽  
Alicia P. Melis ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Social Tolerance ◽  
Significant Variability ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Individual

We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.

scholarly journals Agency in historical institutionalism coalitional work in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Emmenegger
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Historical Institutionalism ◽  
Sociological Institutionalism ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Creation

AbstractInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.

scholarly journals Instantaneous areal population density of entire Atlantic cod and herring spawning groups and group size distribution relative to total spawning population

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas C. Makris ◽  
Olav Rune Godø ◽  
Dong Hoon Yi ◽  
Gavin J. Macaulay ◽  
Ankita D. Jain ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Population Density ◽  
Size Distribution ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Atlantic Cod ◽  
Group Size Distribution

scholarly journals Influencing Attitudes and Preferences Toward Climate Change using a Multi-Player, Transportation Themed Board Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Xiaoyi Kjorven
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Board Game ◽  
Life Choices ◽  
Board Games ◽  
Effective Combination ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Game Board

Traditional tabletop board games have soared in popularity in recent years, and used often as tools for education and entertainment. Board games are an especially engaging format for studying themes of collective-action problem solving. This study looks at one of the most complex collective-action problems of this generation, climate change, and evaluates how individual attitudes and preferences may be altered by playing a board game specifically designed to influence how people relate to an issue. The board game Wheels was introduced and taught to 18 participants, who engaged in five separate playtesting sessions where observation, survey and interview data were collected. The study evaluates participants' attitudes and preferences toward certain transportation and climate change topics before and after playing the game. The game showed promise in changing players' preferences toward certain modes of transportation - increasing preferences toward electric vehicles and cycling, and decreasing preference towards gas powered cars. These findings indicate that the effective combination of select climate change game mechanics in a highly personalized theme may produce an engaging and entertaining experience that has the potential to transcend the game board and impact players' outlook upon real life choices.

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