Effects of Ownership Structure, Firm Performance, Size and Diversification Strategy on CEO Compensation: A Path Analysis

This study performs an in-depth look at the corporate governance, voting and ownership structure of the companies selected using a relatively homogenous data of the U.S. financial sector. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and ownership structure, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. In accord with studies on managerial stock ownership and Tobin’s Q, the pay-for-performance relation appears to be curvilinear in CEO stock ownership

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The Impact of Ownership Structure on Family Firm Performance: Evidence from The Indonesia Stock Exchange

International Conference on Business, Marketing and Information System Management (BMISM'15) Nov. 25-26, 2015 Paris (France) ◽

10.15242/icehm.ed1115005 ◽

2015 ◽

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Ownership Structure ◽

Stock Exchange ◽

Family Firm ◽

The Impact

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CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽

10.26643/gis.v11i5.3423 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 11 (5) ◽

pp. 01-13

Author(s):

Simon Yang

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Executive Compensation ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Relative Sensitivity ◽

Matched Sample ◽

Executive Pay ◽

Corporate Acquisitions ◽

Acquiring Firms ◽

Managerial Power ◽

To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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