Improving the detection and reporting of suspicious financial transactions: the Spanish case

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Harry Clavijo Suntura

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the obligation of regulated entities to detect unusual and suspicious transactions and to report them to external control bodies, as established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, the European Community Directive and also the Spanish regulations for the Prevention of Money Laundering. This research paper also aims to create a model to identify and report suspicious transactions to improve financial institutions’ current procedures. Design/methodology/approach According to the Spanish regulations which comply with the FATF recommendations and the European Community Directive on the Prevention of Money Laundering, regulated entities must detect unusual and suspicious transactions. Within this framework, the present research work analyzes both criteria and procedures used by the regulated entities to report suspicious operations. It also assesses the efficiency of the reports sent to an external control body. For this purpose, both analytical and interpretative methods are used in this research paper. Findings In Spain, the current procedures followed by regulated entities to analyze unusual transactions are complex. This results in difficulties to report suspicious transactions involving money laundering. As a consequence, the cases of suspicious transactions reported to the external control body are often unclear and the related process is inefficient. Originality/value The creation of a harmonized model with the aim of detecting suspicious operations and analyzing them will improve the detection and the effectiveness of the suspicious operations procedure which are reported to the external control body. However, such unified model should take into account the currently used activities proposed by each financial institution.

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-912
Author(s):  
Norman Mugarura

Purpose Regulators have a duty to enforce anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism regulation. However, in doing so, they should not to be overzealous especially in carrying out investigations into suspicious money laundering transactions. This does not mean that oversight agencies should not carry out the required investigations with due diligence. This study aims to propose that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless environment; however, there is a need ensure that businesses are able to operate with minimal regulatory interference. Design/methodology/approach Data was collected from primary and secondary sources such as Uganda’s Anti-Money laundering Act 2013 (amended 2017), Patriot Act 2001, Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 International legal instruments, case law, books, websites, journal papers, policy documents and scholarly debates and evaluated to foster the objectives of the paper accordingly. The paper has also been enriched by empirical experiences of countries in Europe, Africa and within countries on money-laundering regulation and its intricacies. There was a wealth of online data sources and in print, which were reviewed and internalised to foster the objectives for writing the book. Findings Regulation of businesses against money laundering and financing of terrorism imposes a heavy cost burden on poorer countries and should be funded by developed economies for some countries to easily operate desired International AML standards. It also needs to be noted that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless business environment, which makes money laundering an international and national security issue. Originality/value The thesis of this paper was drawn from the author’s presentation to security agencies in Kampala in August 2019. In his presentation, the author opined that investigations into money-laundering offences should be triggered when a financial institution forms suspicions of potential money-laundering offences to have been committed. Some of the questions he sought to answer during the presentation was whether sharing information on “accountable persons or the regulated sector” in Uganda’s AML 2013 with newspapers before investigations are concluded does not amount to tipping off presumed money-laundering culprits? How should investigations be conducted?


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-498
Author(s):  
Veltrice Tan

Purpose In light of the recent 1MDB Scandal in Singapore, this research paper aims to examine the deterrent effect of Singapore’s sanctions against money laundering within financial institutions. Design/methodology/approach Case laws and legislations are examined as are relevant reports by regulators. Findings Singapore’s anti-money laundering (AML) regimes may not act as an effective deterrent against money laundering activities within financial institutions. This is due to the overreliance on the theory of deterrence-based thinking, the lack of an “enforcement pyramid” and economic factors which influence regulators to be lenient towards financial institutions. Research limitations/implications There are limited data available in relation to regulators in Singapore and the prevalence of money laundering activities within Singapore’s financial institution. Any discussions within this article is based on the impressionistic observations of this author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs in Singapore. Practical implications Those who are interested in examining the relationship between money laundering and the deterrent effect of sanctions against financial institutions will have an interest in this topic. Originality/value The value of the paper is to demonstrate that Singapore’s AML regimes may not act as an effective deterrence against money laundering activities within financial institutions.


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