Data protection rules applicable to Financial Intelligence Units: still no clarity in sight

Financial information can play a key role in tackling money laundering, terrorist financing and combatting serious crime more generally. Preventing and fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism were top priorities of the European Union’s (EU) Security Strategy for 2020-2025, which might explain the fast developments regarding legislative measures to further regulate anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism financing (CTF). In May 2020, the European Commission put forward an Action Plan to establish a Union policy on combatting money laundering and shortly afterwards, proposed a new AML Package.Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) play a crucial role in analysing and exchanging information concerning unusual and suspicious transactions, serving as intermediaries between the private sector and law enforcement authorities (LEAs). Such information includes personal data, which is protected under the EU data protection acquis. The latter is constituted of two main laws, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which applies to general processing and the so-called Law Enforcement Directive (LED) that is applicable when competent law enforcement authorities process personal data for law enforcement purposes.This Article argues that the current legal framework on AML and CTF legislation is unclear on the data protection regime that applies to the processing of personal data by FIUs and that the proposed AML Package does little or nothing to clarify this dilemma. In order to contribute to the discussion on the applicable data protection framework for FIUs, the assessment puts forward arguments for and against the application of the LED to such processing, taking into account the relevant legal texts on AML and data protection.

Kryminalizacja finansowania terroryzmu w świetle przepisu art. 165a kodeksu karnego. Część 1

Progressing globalization, ease of movement and the pace of information flow undoubtedly have intensified the threat of an important social problem — terrorism. An key instrument of combating terrorist activity is counteracting its financing. This article will analyze the crime of financing terrorism, which has been typified in Art. 165a of the Polish Criminal Code. An attempt will be made to answer the question of whether the legislative measures taken in the above-mentioned scope are purposeful, necessary and justified. The genesis of the current legal regulations in the field of counteracting the financing of terrorism in the Polish penal code will be also presented.

A Lavagem de Dinheiro e o Financiamento do Terrorismo no Mercado de Seguros, Capitalização e Previdência Privada Aberta

This article focus on the emergence of the criminalization of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, as well as the conventions and bodies that promote the prevention of these crimes. It also approaches how the current transnational crime – and evolution of how they are commited – as well as the need for fast and constant legislative adaptation and the creation of specialized bodies to combat these crimes. It further discusses the recent interest of criminals in the insurance, capitalization and open private pension market, and thus, it analyzes SUSEP;s Circular nº 612/2020. The methodology used was historical research, addressing the evolution of conventions and legislation on the subject. The objective is to answer the following questions: How did the laws evolve so that they adapt and effectively prevent crime? Which international and national bodies are responsible for this prevention? How do terrorists operate in the insurance market, and what does the program to prevent money laundering and combat the financing of terrorism have in place? It is concludes that the union of countries is essential for the fight against terrorism, as well as the evolution of legislation on the subject, in order to cover all phases of the process, including the raising of resources. We can also conclude that Circular SUSEP nº 612/2020 is in line with the policies on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, as it is aligned with the risk-based approach model.

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERRORISM

Acts of terrorism often result in fatalities, but the impact of terrorism is not limited to loss of lives. Terrorism acts can disturb or suspend the peace process; they cause, lengthen, or deepen conflicts and escalate violence. In addition, terrorism has an effect on the economy of the state, given that combatting of terrorism requires significant temporal and financial resources.The threat posed by international terrorism not only constitutes one of the biggest challenges that the world and Europe in particular is currently facing, but also affects the security and economic interests of the Latvian nationals. In addition, terrorism-related crimes threaten the security of not only separate states, but that of the entire international community as well.In the view of the author, the relevance of the topic is illustrated by the fact that 23 May 2018, saw the Criminal Act of Latvia being complemented by a new (IX1) section on “Crimes Related to Terrorism”, thereby underscoring the preparedness of Latvia to adjust its legislative framework in order to avert possible threats of terrorism. The new version of the law sees terrorism, financing of terrorism, invitation to terrorism and terrorism threats, recruitment and training of persons for terrorism, travelling for terrorism purposes, and justification of terrorism classified as criminal offences.Author has chosen the topic of terrorism with the aim of exploring the definition of terrorism and its depiction in international and Latvian law, as well as analysing the criminal liability for terrorism prescribed by the Latvian law and determining the issues associated with the classification of terrorism.The paper consists of introduction, three chapters, and conclusion. In the first chapter, the definition of terrorism is considered. The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of criminal liability for terrorism under the Latvian law, and the third chapter – to the issues associated with the classification of terrorism. Finally, conclusions with respect to the threats posed by terrorism to the European Union and Latvia are drawn.

THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF A COMPLIANCE OFFICER IN THE ACTIVITIES OF A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE LEGALIZATION (LAUNDERING) OF CRIMINALLY ACQUIRED FUNDS AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

The relevance of the topic is confirmed by the changes taking place in the financial monitoring system: the complication of procedures aimed at countering money laundering and financing of terrorism, the creation of specialized international and European requirements and the changes of requirements for compliance specialists. Financial institutions more often face the incompetence the incompetence of these employees and their negligence. The author analysed anti money laundering and counter financing of terrorism legal acts, as well as revealed the main recommendations to financial institutions for preventing money laundering and terrorism financing. Based on scientific research, the main risk factors for using financial institutions for money laundering were identified. Based on these risks factors, the author identified the role and importance of a compliance officer in order to prevent the legalization (laundering) of criminally acquired funds and the financing of terrorism.

Providing a headquarters for business to a company from the same capital group and the status of an obligated institution

Purpose By implementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 20, 2015, the Polish legislator decided to pass the Act of 1 March 2018 on counteracting money laundering and financing of terrorism (AML). In connection with it, many interpretative doubts have arisen. The purpose of this paper is to explain one of them, namely, to indicate whether the provision by a company of a registered office for economic activity to another company from the same capital group means that the company granting its headquarters has achieved the status of an obligated institution pursuant to Article 2 section 1 point 16 letter c) of AML. Design/methodology/approach This study is based on a grammatical, systemic and functional interpretation. It is enriched with national and supranational regulations, doctrinal considerations and current jurisprudence. Findings On the basis of the conducted analysis, the author concludes that providing a headquarters to another company from the same capital group may mean meeting the conditions of an obligated institution within the meaning of Article 2 section 1 point 16 letter c) of AML and obtaining by the company providing the registered office the status of an obliged entity. Originality/value This paper contributes to the clarification of the AML interpretation problem. Adopting a similar approach when analysing other obligated institutions may positively influence the consolidation of the correct interpretation path of AML regulations.

FINANCING THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN CHECHNYA IN THE LATE 20TH - EARLY 21ST CENTURIES

Вопросы борьбы с терроризмом и особенно с финансированием террористической деятельности всегда имели первостепенное значение в работе спецслужб и всех правоохранительных органов мирового сообщества. Особенно успешной представляется работа российской правоохранительной системы. В 2019 г. в Российской Федерации предотвращено 57 преступлений террористического характера, в том числе 34 теракта. В результате работы спецслужб нейтрализовано 32 преступника, из них девять главарей террористических группировок, а всего за 2019 г. задержаны 41 главарь, 241 боевик и 606 пособников террористов. В период подготовки статьи стало известно, что 4 марта 2020 г. сотрудники спецслужб разоблачили террористическую ячейку в г. Тверь, 22 марта 2020 г. ликвидировали боевика, который планировал совершить террористический акт в Башкирии, 27 марта 2020 г. органами ФСБ в Краснодарском крае задержан 27-летний россиянин, у которого обнаружено и изъято взрывное устройство, а в его смартфоне обнаружена переписка с членами запрещенной в РФ группировки «Исламское государство». Возможность осуществлять террористическую деятельность напрямую зависит от ее финансирования, а поэтому спецслужбы уделяют особое внимание перекрытию каналов финансирования терроризма. Так, в начале 2019 г. УФСБ по Краснодарскому краю пресечен масштабный канал финансирования терроризма, организованный членами так называемого «Краснодарского джимада». Пособниками террористов был осуществлен перевод денежных средств в размере более 10 млн р. на счета, используемые террористической организацией «Исламское государство». В состав преступной группы входили жители Краснодарского края, республик Дагестан, Северная Осетия, граждане Азербайджана. Перечисленные примеры говорят о необходимости обобщать и распространять опыт спецслужб Российской Федерации, и особенно находящихся на Северном Кавказе, по перекрытию каналов финансирования террористической деятельности и борьбе с терроризмом. В предлагаемой статье мы рассматриваем финансовые истоки международной террористической деятельности на Северном Кавказе, а именно основные черты и особенности преступного финансирования первого в мире террористического государства «Ичкерия» на территории Чеченской республики. К сожалению, исторический опыт и уроки борьбы с международным терроризмом Российской Федерации до сих пор не усвоен ее зарубежными партнерами, что повлекло в дальнейшем создание еще более мощного террористического государства на территории Ирака и Сирии. The fight against terrorism, especially terrorist financing, has always had a high priority in the work of the special services and all law enforcement agencies of the world community. The work of the Russian law enforcement system seems to be particularly successful. In 2019 in the Russian Federation 57 of terrorist crimes were prevented, including 34 attacks. As a result of work of the security services 32 of the offender were neutralized, nine of which were leaders of terrorist groups, and in 2019 the total 41 gangleaders were arrested as well as 241 terrorist fighters and 606 accomplices of terrorists. During the preparation of the article, it became known that on March 4, 2020, the security services exposed a terrorist cell in the city of Tver, on the 22 March 2020 liquidated terrorist fighters who planned to commit terrorist acts in Bashkiria and on March 27, 2020 a 27-year-old Russian was detained by the FSB in Krasnodar region, an explosive device was discovered and seized. In his smartphone there was a correspondence with members of the «Islamic state» banned in Russia. The opportunity to carry out a terrorist activity is directly dependent on its funding, and therefore the security services are paying special attention to the overlapping of channels of financing of terrorism. So, in early 2019, the FSB in Krasnodar region prevented large-scale channel of financing of terrorism, organized by members of the so-called «Krasnodar jimad». Accomplices of terrorists were carried out the transfer of funds in the amount of 10 million rubles to the accounts used by the terrorist organization «Islamic state». The structure of the criminal group consisted of residents of the Krasnodar territory, the republics of Dagestan, North Ossetia, the citizens of Azerbaijan. These examples speak of the need to consolidate and disseminate the experience of special services of the Russian Federation, and especially those in the North Caucasus, to cut off the channels of financing terrorist activities and the fight against terrorism. In the present paper we considered the financial sources of international terrorist activities in the North Caucasus, namely the main features and peculiarities of criminal funding the world's first terrorist state «Ichkeria» on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Unfortunately, the foreign partners of Russian haven’t learnt its historical experience and lessons of the fight against international terrorism, which resulted in the further establishment of a more powerful terrorist state in Iraq and Syria.