Bidding Learning Model and Its Analysis in Oligopoly Power Market with Linear Demand Function

Author(s):  
Xinhua Zhang ◽  
Wenjuan Li
2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan N.M. Lagerlöf

If Cournot oligopolists face uncertainty about the intercept of a linear demand function and if the realized market price must be non-negative, then expected demand becomes convex, which can create a multiplicity of equilibria. This note shows that if the distribution of the demand intercept has a monotone hazard rate and if another, rather weak, assumption is satisfied, then uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 89-100
Author(s):  
Manik Mondal ◽  
Mohammed Forhad Uddin ◽  
Kazi Anowar Hussain

This paper develops an inventory model for deteriorating items consisting the ordering cost, unit cost, opportunity cost, deterioration cost and shortage cost. In this inventory model instead of linear demand function nonlinear exponential function of time for deteriorating items with deterioration rate has been considered. The formulated model has numerically solved by bisection method. The effects of inflation and cash flow are also taken into account under a trade-credit policy of discount with time. In order to validate the model, numerical examples have been solved by bisection method using Matlab. Further, the sensitivity of different parameters is considered in order to estimate the cash flow.GANIT J. Bangladesh Math. Soc.Vol. 34 (2014) 89-100


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-164
Author(s):  
Manik Mondol ◽  
M. Forhad Uddin ◽  
M. S. Hossain

This paper develops an inventory model for deteriorating items consisting the ordering cost, unit cost, opportunity cost, deterioration cost and shortage cost. In this inventory model instead of linear demand function nonlinear exponential function of time for deteriorating items with deterioration rate has been considered. The effects of inflation and cash flow are also taken into account under a trade-credit policy of discount and without discount with time. In order to validate the model, numerical examples have been solved by bisection method deploying Matlab.  Further, in order to estimate the cash flow the sensitivity of different parameters is considered.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tönu Puu

In dynamic models in economics, often “rational expectations” are assumed. These are meant to show that the agents can correctly foresee the result of their own and the other agents' actions. In this paper, it is shown that this cannot happen in a simple oligopoly model with a linear demand function and constant marginal costs. “Naive expectations,” that is, where each agent assumes the other agents to retain their previous period action, are shown to result in a 2-period cycle. However, adapting to the observed periodicity always doubles the actual resulting periodicity. In general, it is impossible for the agents to learn any periodicity except the trivial case of a fixed point. This makes the whole idea of “rational expectations” untenable in Cournot oligopoly models.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Xing Yao ◽  
Lian Shi ◽  
Hao Xi

We analyze a triopoly game model with fully heterogeneous players when the demand function is isoelastic. The three players were considered to be bounded rational, adaptive, and naïve. Existing equilibrium points and their locally asymptotic stability conditions are studied. Complexity of the dynamical system is examined by means of numerical simulations, such as period cycles, bifurcation diagrams, strange attractors and sensitive, dependence on initial conditions. This paper extends the result of Tramontana (2010) who considered a heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function. Comparisons with respect to the heterogeneous triopoly model of Elabbasy et al. (2009) assuming linear demand function are performed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongmei Liu ◽  
Chunjie Ding ◽  
Chen Fan ◽  
Xiaohong Chen

Under dual-channel structure, the free-riding behavior based on different service levels between online channel and offline channel cannot be avoided, which would lead to channel unfairness. This study implies that the dual-channel supply chain is built up by online channel controlled by manufacturer and traditional channel controlled by retailer, respectively. Under this channel structure, we rebuild the linear demand function considering free-riding behavior and modify the pricing model based on channel fairness. Then the influences of fair factor and free-riding behavior on manufacturer and retailer pricing and performance are discussed. Finally, we propose some numerical analysis to provide some valuable recommendations for manufacturer and retailer improving channel management performance.


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