Exploitation of an opponent's imperfect information in a stochastic game with autonomous vehicle application

Author(s):  
W.M. McEneaney ◽  
R. Singh
Author(s):  
Petr Tomášek ◽  
Karel Horák ◽  
Aditya Aradhye ◽  
Branislav Bošanský ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee

We study the two-player zero-sum extension of the partially observable stochastic shortest-path problem where one agent has only partial information about the environment. We formulate this problem as a partially observable stochastic game (POSG): given a set of target states and negative rewards for each transition, the player with imperfect information maximizes the expected undiscounted total reward until a target state is reached. The second player with the perfect information aims for the opposite. We base our formalism on POSGs with one-sided observability (OS-POSGs) and give the following contributions: (1) we introduce a novel heuristic search value iteration algorithm that iteratively solves depth-limited variants of the game, (2) we derive the bound on the depth guaranteeing an arbitrary precision, (3) we propose a novel upper-bound estimation that allows early terminations, and (4) we experimentally evaluate the algorithm on a pursuit-evasion game.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Bishop

Artificial Neural Networks have reached “grandmaster” and even “super-human” performance across a variety of games, from those involving perfect information, such as Go, to those involving imperfect information, such as “Starcraft”. Such technological developments from artificial intelligence (AI) labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business, where an “AI” brand-tag is quickly becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI gets things wrong—an autonomous vehicle crashes, a chatbot exhibits “racist” behavior, automated credit-scoring processes “discriminate” on gender, etc.—there are often significant financial, legal, and brand consequences, and the incident becomes major news. As Judea Pearl sees it, the underlying reason for such mistakes is that “... all the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting.” The key, as Pearl suggests, is to replace “reasoning by association” with “causal reasoning” —the ability to infer causes from observed phenomena. It is a point that was echoed by Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis in a recent piece for the New York Times: “we need to stop building computer systems that merely get better and better at detecting statistical patterns in data sets—often using an approach known as ‘Deep Learning’—and start building computer systems that from the moment of their assembly innately grasp three basic concepts: time, space, and causality.” In this paper, foregrounding what in 1949 Gilbert Ryle termed “a category mistake”, I will offer an alternative explanation for AI errors; it is not so much that AI machinery cannot “grasp” causality, but that AI machinery (qua computation) cannot understand anything at all.


2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1203-1205
Author(s):  
JinHo Yun ◽  
◽  
Eun-Ju Lee ◽  
Bo-yong Park ◽  
Kyoungseob Byeon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

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