A survey of covert channels and countermeasures in computer network protocols

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 44-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Zander ◽  
Grenville Armitage ◽  
Philip Branch
2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-310
Author(s):  
Pilu Crescenzi ◽  
Giorgio Gambosi ◽  
Gaia Innocenti

Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 284
Author(s):  
Marios Anagnostopoulos ◽  
John André Seem

Covert channel communications are of vital importance for the ill-motivated purposes of cyber-crooks. Through these channels, they are capable of communicating in a stealthy way, unnoticed by the defenders and bypassing the security mechanisms of protected networks. The covert channels facilitate the hidden distribution of data to internal agents. For instance, a stealthy covert channel could be beneficial for the purposes of a botmaster that desires to send commands to their bot army, or for exfiltrating corporate and sensitive private data from an internal network of an organization. During the evolution of Internet, a plethora of network protocols has been exploited as covert channel. DNS protocol however has a prominent position in this exploitation race, as it is one of the few protocols that is rarely restricted by security policies or filtered by firewalls, and thus fulfills perfectly a covert channel’s requirements. Therefore, there are more than a few cases where the DNS protocol and infrastructure are exploited in well-known security incidents. In this context, the work at hand puts forward by investigating the feasibility of exploiting the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) as a covert channel. We demonstrate that is beneficial and quite straightforward to embed the arbitrary data of an aggressor’s choice within the DNSKEY resource record, which normally provides the public key of a DNSSEC-enabled domain zone. Since DNSKEY contains the public key encoded in base64 format, it can be easily exploited for the dissemination of an encrypted or stego message, or even for the distribution of a malware’s binary encoded in base64 string. To this end, we implement a proof of concept based on two prominent nameserver software, namely BIND and NDS, and we publish in the DNS hierarchy custom data of our choice concealed as the public key of the DNS zone under our jurisdiction in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed covert channel.


Computer ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 8-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schneider

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 276-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.W. El-Kharashi ◽  
G. Darling ◽  
B. Marykuca ◽  
G.C. Shoja

Author(s):  
L. S. Chumbley ◽  
M. Meyer ◽  
K. Fredrickson ◽  
F.C. Laabs

The Materials Science Department at Iowa State University has developed a laboratory designed to improve instruction in the use of the scanning electron microscope (SEM). The laboratory makes use of a computer network and a series of remote workstations in a classroom setting to provide students with increased hands-on access to the SEM. The laboratory has also been equipped such that distance learning via the internet can be achieved.A view of the laboratory is shown in Figure 1. The laboratory consists of a JEOL 6100 SEM, a Macintosh Quadra computer that acts as a server for the network and controls the energy dispersive spectrometer (EDS), four Macintosh computers that act as remote workstations, and a fifth Macintosh that acts as an internet server. A schematic layout of the classroom is shown in Figure 2. The workstations are connected directly to the SEM to allow joystick and computer control of the microscope. An ethernet connection between the Quadra and the workstations allows students seated there to operate the EDS. Control of the microscope and joystick is passed between the workstations by a switch-box assembly that resides at the microscope console. When the switch-box assembly is activated a direct serial line is established between the specified workstation and the microscope via the SEM’s RS-232.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document