New Directions for NewHope: Improving Performance of Post-Quantum Cryptography through Algorithm-level Pipelining

Author(s):  
Luke Beckwith ◽  
William Diehl
Author(s):  
Ming-Shing Chen ◽  
Tung Chou ◽  
Markus Krausz

BIKE is a key encapsulation mechanism that entered the third round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. This paper presents two constant-time implementations for BIKE, one tailored for the Intel Haswell and one tailored for the ARM Cortex-M4. Our Haswell implementation is much faster than the avx2 implementation written by the BIKE team: for bikel1, the level-1 parameter set, we achieve a 1.39x speedup for decapsulation (which is the slowest operation) and a 1.33x speedup for the sum of all operations. For bikel3, the level-3 parameter set, we achieve a 1.5x speedup for decapsulation and a 1.46x speedup for the sum of all operations. Our M4 implementation is more than two times faster than the non-constant-time implementation portable written by the BIKE team. The speedups are achieved by both algorithm-level and instruction-level optimizations.


Author(s):  
Alejandro Cohen ◽  
Rafael G. L. DrOliveira ◽  
Salman Salamatian ◽  
Muriel Medard

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Taiber ◽  

Quantum computing is considered the “next big thing” when it comes to solving computational problems impossible to tackle using conventional computers. However, a major concern is that quantum computers could be used to crack current cryptographic schemes designed to withstand traditional cyberattacks. This threat also impacts future automated vehicles as they become embedded in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) ecosystem. In this scenario, encrypted data is transmitted between a complex network of cloud-based data servers, vehicle-based data servers, and vehicle sensors and controllers. While the vehicle hardware ages, the software enabling V2X interactions will be updated multiple times. It is essential to make the V2X ecosystem quantum-safe through use of “post-quantum cryptography” as well other applicable quantum technologies. This SAE EDGE™ Research Report considers the following three areas to be unsettled questions in the V2X ecosystem: How soon will quantum computing pose a threat to connected and automated vehicle technologies? What steps and measures are needed to make a V2X ecosystem “quantum-safe?” What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective?


Author(s):  
Johanna Sepulveda ◽  
Dominik Winkler ◽  
Daniel Sepulveda ◽  
Mario Cupelli ◽  
Radek Olexa

Nature ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 549 (7671) ◽  
pp. 188-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Bernstein ◽  
Tanja Lange

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Youngjoo An ◽  
Hyang-Sook Lee ◽  
Juhee Lee ◽  
Seongan Lim

The notion of key substitution security on digital signatures in the multiuser setting has been proposed by Menezes and Smart in 2004. Along with the unforgeability of signature, the key substitution security is very important since it is a critical requirement for the nonrepudiation and the authentication of the signature. Lattice-based signature is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography, and the unforgeability of each scheme has been relatively well studied. In this paper, we present key substitution attacks on BLISS, Lyubashevsky’s signature scheme, and GPV and thus show that these signature schemes do not provide nonrepudiation. We also suggest how to avoid key substitution attack on these schemes.


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