Design of Incentive Mechanism for Project Managers Based on Monitoring Mechanism under Asymmetric Information Condition

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Yan-li ◽  
Zhao Chen-guang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism

Heterogeneous Market Responses and the Listing Effect in M&A

2012 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingzhong Ma ◽  
David A. Whidbee ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
Conventional Approach ◽  
Omitted Variables ◽  
Market Responses ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Method Of Payment ◽  
Pooled Samples

Unlisted acquisitions differ from listed ones in three important aspects: the possibility of forming blockholders, which substitute debt as a monitoring mechanism; the liquidity discount, which mitigates managerial hubris; and the distinct deal process through which two-sided asymmetric information is revealed. Due to these differences, same firm and deal characteristics could induce heterogeneous market responses, depending on the target listing status. We find that such heterogeneous responses exist in usual characteristics such as method of payment, relative size, acquirer size, leverage, and market-to-book ratios. After these heterogeneous responses are incorporated, the puzzling "listing effect" disappears. Our results also indicate that the conventional approach used to investigate pooled samples of listed and unlisted acquisitions is effectively misspecified due to omitted variables.

scholarly journals Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Cooperative Relay ◽  
Relay Nodes ◽  
Relay Incentive

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.

Parameterized Model Design and Extension for Principal-Agent Incentive Mechanism

2011 ◽  
Vol 55-57 ◽  
pp. 1869-1874
Author(s):  
Jun Chen ◽  
Yan Li Xu ◽  
Dan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Substitution Effect ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Model Design ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Parameterized Model

Parameterized model of principal-agent incentive mechanism has been designed through mathematical analysis in this paper. The analysis of monitoring mechanism is introduced in the principal-agent incentive mechanism, which extends the theoretical framework of incentives. The results show that: monitoring mechanisms and incentive mechanisms are relevant and the interaction between them has a substitution effect. They can encourage or induce an agent to work hard. Therefore, incentive mechanisms and monitoring mechanisms should be taken into account in the process of compensation contract formation. The introduction of monitoring mechanisms not only has some innovations in theory, but also has great value in practice.

Contract design for relay incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information in cooperative networks

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 3029-3044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Rui Liu ◽  
Yang Chen ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Yunhao Jiang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Relay Incentive
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document