Profit allocation in mobile commerce value chain based on the evolution game theory

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyu Chen ◽  
Shuiqing Yang ◽  
Yuzhi Cao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Value Chain ◽  
Mobile Commerce ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Evolution Game

Study of SARFT and Telecom Operators in IPTV Industry Chain Based on Evolution Game Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 328-330 ◽  
pp. 998-1002
Author(s):  
Ling Ma ◽  
Chen Ye Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Technical Support ◽  
Positive Development ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Business In China ◽  
Evolution Game

Since the IPTV business in China has been carried out, the development of telecom operators is not always ideal due to the access restrictions of SARFT content, and broadcasting companies also need technical support to carry out IPTV services. This paper analyzed the cooperative game of SARFT providing content and telecom operators providing bandwidth respectively in IPTV industry chain based on the limited rationality, in order to obtain corresponding stable strategies to provide certain basis for correlative decision-making and policy formulation, thus promoting the positive development of IPTV business.

scholarly journals Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Changxi Ma ◽  
Mingxia Gao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Taxi Driver ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Evolution Game

For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.

scholarly journals A game theory application of a cruise value chain – the case of China

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace W.Y. Wang ◽  
Qingcheng Zeng ◽  
Chenrui Qu ◽  
Joan Mileski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Value Chain ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
Decision Making Processes

Purpose Regardless of the facts showing a booming Chinese cruise market, cruise operations in China are very different from the current practices of the two major cruise markets – the US and the Mediterranean Sea. This study aims to quantify pricing strategies and possible incentive mechanisms of cruise operations in China. Design/methodology/approach Using optimization in economic-based game theory, the complexity of the pricing strategies and interaction and/or possible coordination within the cruise value-added chain can be captured. Findings The results show that a coordinative pricing strategy with Shapley profit redistribution within the value-added chain offers benefits to both cruise passengers and service suppliers. With two subsidy scenarios, one to the passenger and the other to the travel agent, a cooperative pricing strategy outperforms other strategies and successfully increases market shares and total revenue. Originality/value The advantages of coordination between participants in cruise value chain are quantified. Effective strategies for attracting players participating in cruise value chain are designed. This paper will provide market participants with strategies to enhance their decision-making processes.

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