Study of SARFT and Telecom Operators in IPTV Industry Chain Based on Evolution Game Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 328-330 ◽  
pp. 998-1002
Author(s):  
Ling Ma ◽  
Chen Ye Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Technical Support ◽  
Positive Development ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Business In China ◽  
Evolution Game

Since the IPTV business in China has been carried out, the development of telecom operators is not always ideal due to the access restrictions of SARFT content, and broadcasting companies also need technical support to carry out IPTV services. This paper analyzed the cooperative game of SARFT providing content and telecom operators providing bandwidth respectively in IPTV industry chain based on the limited rationality, in order to obtain corresponding stable strategies to provide certain basis for correlative decision-making and policy formulation, thus promoting the positive development of IPTV business.

On Inheritance of Complementarity in Non-Additive Measures Under Bounded Interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Katsushige Fujimoto ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Making ◽  
Multicriteria Decision ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
Additive Measures ◽  
Exponential Complexity

The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).

scholarly journals MODIFICATION OF SHAPLEY VALUE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN DECISION MAKING

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Leszek Zaremba ◽  
Cezary S. Zaremba ◽  
Marek Suchenek
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Practical Point ◽  
Actual Strength

Abstract The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.

Study on the Engineering Project Tender Offer Game Type

2013 ◽  
Vol 860-863 ◽  
pp. 3049-3053
Author(s):  
Wan Lin Liu ◽  
Lin Xiu Cai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Market Entry ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Engineering Project ◽  
Tender Offer ◽  
Construction Market ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Game Type

The article analyzed three game types in the process of the project tender offer, such as the static Bayesian game, the construction market entry and the cooperative game, which based on the game theory. And it determined what the methods and measures of tender offer should be taken according to the different kind of game types of bidders, and the research of achievement can provide a reference to enterprises decision-making on tender offer, which have strong operability.

Pricing Decision Study of Ecological Industry Chain Based on Uncertain Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 664 ◽  
pp. 8-12
Author(s):  
Hai Jie Yu ◽  
Sheng Su
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Ecological Industry

A two stages ecological industry chain was took as study background. The downstream buy amount is uncertain demand. Stock of byproduct is certain. There are two kinds of situations. Buy amount is higher or lower than byproduct stock. Price decisions of byproducts were studied based on game theory. Sequential game equilibrium (Stackelberg equilibrium) and cooperative game equilibrium (coordination in price decision) were obtained.

An Interval-Based Focalization Method for Decision-Making in Decentralized, Multi-Functional Design

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitesh H. Panchal ◽  
Marco Gero Ferna´ndez ◽  
Janet K. Allen ◽  
Christiaan J. J. Paredis ◽  
Farrokh Mistree
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Design Space ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Functional Design ◽  
Space Partitioning ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Design Variables ◽  
Conflicting Objectives

Multi-functional design problems are characterized by strong coupling between design variables that are controlled by stakeholders from different disciplines. This coupling necessitates efficient modeling of interactions between multiple designers who want to achieve conflicting objectives but share control over design variables. Various game-theoretic protocols such as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower have been used to model interactions between designers. Non-cooperative game theory protocols are of particular interest for modeling cooperation in multi-functional design problems. These are the focus of this paper because they more closely reflect the level of information exchange possible in a distributed environment. Two strategies for solving such non-cooperative game theory problems are: a) passing Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) among designers and combining these to find points of intersection and b) exchanging single points in the design space iteratively until the solution converges to a single point. While the first strategy is computationally expensive because it requires each designer to consider all possible outcomes of decisions made by other designers, the second strategy may result in divergence of the solution. In order to overcome these problems, we present an interval-based focalization method for executing decentralized decision-making problems that are common in multi-functional design scenarios. The method involves propagating ranges of design variables and systematically eliminating infeasible portions of the shared design space. This stands in marked contrast to the successive consideration of single points, as emphasized in current multifunctional design methods. The key advantages of the proposed method are: a) targeted reduction of design freedom and b) non-divergence of solutions. The method is illustrated using two sample scenarios — solution of a decision problem with quadratic objectives and the design of multi-functional Linear Cellular Alloys (LCAs). Implications include use of the method to guide design space partitioning and control assignment.

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