The introduction of pervasive telecommunication devices, in the scope of smart grids (SGs), has accentuated interest in the distribution network, which integrates a huge portion of new grid applications. High impact low probability (HILP) events, such as natural hazards, manmade errors, and cyber-attacks, as well as the inherent fragility of the distribution grid have propelled the development of effective resilience tools and methods for the power distribution network (PDN) to avoid catastrophic infrastructural and economical losses. Multiple resilience evaluation frameworks are proposed in the literature in order to assist distribution system operators (DSOs) in managing their networks when faced with exogenous threats. We conduct detailed analysis of existing quantitative resilience studies in both electric and telecommunication domains of a PDN, focusing on event type, metrics, temporal phases, uncertainty, and critical load. Our work adopts the standpoint of a DSO, whose target is to identify feasible resilience assessment frameworks, which apply to pre-defined requirements in terms of resilience evaluation objectives (planning, reactive response, or simple assessment), time of evaluation, and available enhancement strategies. Finally, results and observations on selected works are presented, followed by discussion of identified challenges and opportunities.
Design and development of a test environment to analyze the impact of cyber attacks on the electrical distribution network
