Power Dimensions in the Board and Outside Director Independence: Evidence from large industrial UK firms

1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Udueni
Keyword(s):  
Outside Director ◽  
Director Independence

On Audit Committee Appointments

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Vafeas
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Committee Appointment ◽  
Outside Director ◽  
Committee Membership ◽  
Director Independence

This study examines determinants of audit committee appointment by comparing characteristics of 262 nonexecutive directors appointed to corporate audit committees between 1995 and 1998 with characteristics of 262 nonexecutive, age-matched control directors. The likelihood of audit committee appointment is found to increase with the degree of outside director independence, and decrease with compensation committee membership, other committee memberships, and the length of board tenure. Importantly, audit committee appointments are unrelated to the amount of stock owned by directors and the number of other directorship posts they hold. Together, these results highlight several director attributes beyond affiliation that could be important in guiding director decisions and suggest the need for further research toward understanding the quality of audit committee appointments.

The Study on the Independence of Outside Director

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong-Wook Won
Keyword(s):  
Outside Director

Outside director compensation and firm performance

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hempel ◽  
Charles Fay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Outside Director

Investigating the Relationship Between Ownership Structure and Investment Efficiency in Emerging Markets: Evidence From the Egyptian Stock Market

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ahmed Sayed Rashed ◽  
Ebitihj Mostafa Abd ◽  
Esraa Fathi Mohamed Ismail ◽  
Doaa Mohamed Abd El Samea
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Outside Director ◽  
Director Ownership ◽  
The Relationship

This paper aims to examine the relationship between Ownership Structure Mechanisms (Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Block holder Ownership and Outside Director Ownership) and Investment Efficiency by using panel data analysis. To investigate this relationship used the multiple regression models. Findings of investigation of 35 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the period 2006 to 2015 by balanced Panel model representative. Results indicated that Managerial Ownership isn’t related with investment efficiency. In contract, institutional ownership, block holder ownership and outside director ownership have a negative relationship with investment efficiency. In addition, the researcher found that control variables (Firm size, Debt ratio, Tobin’s Q) not related to investment efficiency. These findings imply that the Majority of Egyptians firms relies on institutional without individual ownership and then reduces much of possible from agency problems and decreasing information asymmetry and facilitating the monitoring of investment decisions.

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