The Effect Of Corporate Governance And Political Connections On The Application Of Conditional Conservatism (Study On Non-Financial Companies Registered In Indonesian Stock Exchange In 2012-2018)

This study aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance and political connections on the application of conditional conservatism. The sample in this study are non-financial companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2012-2018. The number of samples in this study were 82 non-financial companies. Data analysis was performed with multiple regression analysis. The result of study showed that board of commissioner, audit committee size, audit committee independence, and institutional ownership have an effect on conditional conservatism. This study also has a result that political connections have a negatif influence on conditional conservatism. It means more higher the companies have indicated by political connections, the lower the application of conditional conservatism. Variable board of director, independence commissioner, auditor expertise, the quality of the accounting firm which is proxied by BIG4, and managerial ownership have no effect on conditional conservatism.

Director independence: Going beyond misaligned incentives to resource dependence

Board director independence is critical to achieving and maintaining control to address the agency theory–based issue of interest misalignment between the principal (the organization) and the executives (agent). However, theoretical and empirical research and strategic risk considerations have brought into question the role or relevance that director independence plays in these control task and agency theory domains. We ask, using a quantitative survey method, whether board activity–based applications of independence may be associated with the service task of the board, namely its resource dependence mission. Our findings suggest that the resource dependence duty of the board may be positively associated with some autonomous activities, and yet other activities might be driven primarily by normative practices. Based on this, we suggest that a theoretical scope beyond and greater than agency theory may be needed when reassessing the role of director independence. JEL Classification: M1, O3

Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Commercial Banks of Nepal

Corporate governance in banking sector has received great attention among policymakers, practitioners and academicians in Nepal due to governance failures in some financial institutions in recent period. This study attempts to examine the corporate governance mechanisms adopted by Nepalese commercial banks by using a panel data of 30 commercial banks from 2012 to 2016. The internal corporate governance mechanisms are board structure and composition, board committees, director independence, transparency and disclosure, director remuneration, and shareholders rights. The study employs ANOVA test to examine differences in corporate governance mechanisms among state-owned, joint venture, and domestic banks. The study findings reveal that the corporate governance practices in financial institutions of Nepal is somewhat satisfactory; however, significant improvements are required especially in case of state-owned banks and local private banks. In order to achieve the policy of government of Nepal to enhance financial system stability, one of the major areas for policy focus should be to promote enhancement of corporate governance standards in the financial institutions as the stability of the banking sector depends largely on corporate governance practices they adopt. Promoting director independence, improving transparency and disclosure, and enhancing shareholders’ right are found to be important for improving standard of corporate governance in Nepal.

Reflecting on Corporate Governance in South Africa: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward

Background: South Africa is a corporate governance pioneer. The King Reports have offered guidance to listed companies in the country since 1994 and unlisted entities since 2016. In the drive for corporate change, attention is increasingly placed on the role of activist shareholders, in particular institutional investors, given the size of their investments. Purpose/objectives: This study aimed to gauge institutional investors’ views on the differences between the King III and IV Reports related to positive aspects and room for improvement. Design/methodology/approach: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected institutional investors. Themes were then derived by conducting an interpretive thematic analysis. Findings: Interviewees commended the format and scope of the latest King Report but suggested that outcomes-based training should be offered to directors to ease implementation. Executive remuneration, director independence and auditor independence were highlighted as areas that require attention. Some interviewees questioned whether the current non-binding vote on executive remuneration is sufficient. They suggested that executive remuneration should be tied to performance outcomes across the triple bottom line. Participants recommended that director independence should be considered on a case-by-case basis, instead of strictly applying King IV’s suggested tenure guideline. Furthermore, mandatory audit firm rotation could enhance auditor independence, and hence transparency. Stakeholders are encouraged to demand enhanced transparency on corporate matters to enable more informed decision-making.

KEBIJAKAN HUTANG, TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL

The purpose of the study was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of debt policy, director size, director independence, institutional ownership, and female directors on accrual earnings management. Samples were obtained through purposive sampling method as many as 102 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016. The results showed that debt policy had a significant effect on accrual earnings management. While the director's size, director's independence, institutional ownership, and female directors do not have a significant effect on accrual earnings management. Management does not dare to make accrual earnings management because they get close supervision from creditors.

KEBIJAKAN HUTANG, TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL

The purpose of the study was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of debt policy, director size, director independence, institutional ownership, and female directors on accrual earnings management. Samples were obtained through purposive sampling method as many as 102 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016. The results showed that debt policy had a significant effect on accrual earnings management. While the director's size, director's independence, institutional ownership, and female directors do not have a significant effect on accrual earnings management. Management does not dare to make accrual earnings management because they get close supervision from creditors.

Independence in Practice: Superannuation Fund Governance through the Eyes of Fund Directors

This article reports on a series of interviews with superannuation fund directors that examine how director independence is framed, viewed and operationalised in the superannuation context. The interviews highlight the interaction between structural independence rules and other familiar governance issues, such as remuneration, nomination and board tenure arrangements. The role and potential for independence to address conflicts of interest, skills and diversity issues is also discussed. The paper concludes that independence reforms such as those envisaged in recent government proposals have the potential to deal with some of the governance shortfalls present in the various sectors of the superannuation system, but only if carefully drafted and appropriately buttressed with ancillary regulation.

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

In the backdrop of the convergence–divergence debate, the goal of this article is to examine the proliferation of corporate governance codes in the light of a single factor, namely varying corporate ownership structures across countries. While such codes emanated and became popular in the United Kingdom where companies largely display dispersed shareholding, the concept has been disseminated to countries that carry considerably different ownership structures, i.e. mainly concentrated shareholding. This is bound to give rise to incongruities in the implementation of these codes. In order to enunciate the claim made above, the article will consider two aspects that convergence advocates have focused on, namely (i) shareholder empowerment and (ii) self-regulation. For example, corporate governance codes place considerable emphasis on the structure and independence of the boards of directors of companies as a means to ensure shareholder protection. While this approach is meant to produce results in companies with dispersed shareholding, the same cannot be said of companies with concentrated shareholding where the empowerment of shareholders through director independence or other means would only embolden the already dominant controlling shareholders. Moving to self-regulation, a voluntary code operating on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis can ensure sufficient adherence only if certain factors are present in the jurisdiction where it is applied. Relying upon available empirical evidence, this article finds that use of self-regulation in voluntary codes of corporate governance may generate different results depending upon the ownership structures of companies, thereby exhibiting signs of divergence on this count.