The study of how people make decisions has long been dominated by the economic man or rationality model. In recent years researchers have extended the study of decision making into the spatial context. Given the pervasive role of the rationality model it was not surprising to see reliance on it in this new domain as well (Golledge & Timmermans, 1987; Timmermans, this volume). There are, however, at least two reasons why one might have hoped for a broader perspective. First, given its obvious kinship to the area of environmental cognition, research on spatial decision making could have reflected the concern for cognitive structure central to the wayfinding literature. Second, the rationality model has increasingly been the subject of searching questions and criticism. Cracks have been appearing in the once near-monolithic support for this model. A number of psychologists have been quite articulate about what they see as serious deficiencies in this approach (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Herrnstein & Mazur, 1987; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Simon, 1957; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Even economists have expressed serious reservations (Bell & Kristol, 1981; Earl, 1983a; Eichner, 1983; Kuttner, 1985; Lutz, 1987). Decision theorists have not been insensitive to these concerns; many modifications have been proposed (see Jungermann, 1983, for an extensive review). If there is a consensus among them, it is far from obvious. In the absence of such a consensus, many stalwart investigators (including economists and planners) continue within the comfortable and familiar confines of the classical framework. In the discussion that follows, the term “rationality” will be used to refer to the classical rationality position that still endures in many quarters, and that still serves as a center of gravity for the multitude of dissatisfied revisionists. In its simplest form, the position can be summarized as stating that people have perfect knowledge and that they strive to maximize their gains. A most interesting analysis of the increasingly obvious inadequacy of the rationality model and of how planners are coping with this state of affairs is provided by E.R. Alexander (1984). The picture he paints is essentially one of a paradigm decline, with heroic efforts on the part of practitioners to carry on nonetheless.
ROLE OF THE STREET NETWORK IN BURGLARS' SPATIAL DECISION-MAKING*
