The interplay of corporate social responsibility and corporate political activity in emerging markets: The role of strategic flexibility in non‐market strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rifat Kamasak ◽  
Simon R. James ◽  
Meltem Yavuz
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Strategic Flexibility ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Market Strategies

Nonmarket Responses to Regulation: A Signaling Theory Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 865-891
Author(s):  
Lee Warren Brown ◽  
Irene Goll ◽  
Abdul A. Rasheed ◽  
Wayne S. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Federal Regulations ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regulatory Intensity ◽  
Corporate Social

We examine how regulatory intensity and increases in regulation affect the nonmarket activities of firms. Using a signaling theory perspective, we seek to better understand how firms respond to regulation in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity (CPA), the two main pillars of nonmarket activity. Examination of both CSR and CPA in concert rather than in isolation provides insights into whether they are complements or substitutes. We use textual analysis of the US Code of Federal Regulations to measure regulatory intensity and increases in regulation. Based on a sample of 331 S&P 500 firms for the period 1998–2014, our findings suggest that regulatory intensity leads to more nonmarket responses from firms. We also find support for nonlinear relationships between CSR and CPA.

Corporate Political Activity and Sensitivity to Social Attacks: The Case of Family-Managed Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-174
Author(s):  
James G. Combs ◽  
Richard J. Gentry ◽  
Sean Lux ◽  
Peter Jaskiewicz ◽  
T. Russell Crook
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Large Firms ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Standard And Poor's ◽  
Corporate Social

Family-managed firms take actions to protect their reputations. We theorize that one such action involves avoiding corporate political activity (CPA) that expose firms to social attack, especially when also invested in corporate social responsibility. Because large firms are frequent targets for social attack, the same sensitivity that encourages most family managers to avoid CPA encourages it among the largest as a buffer. Supportive analysis of Standard and Poor’s 500 firms shows that family-managed firms spend, on average, 86% less on CPA, even less when invested in substantive corporate social responsibility. The largest invest as much or more in CPA as nonfamily peers.

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