Corporate political activity of baby food companies in Thailand

Background Recent studies show corporate political activity (CPA) can have detrimental impacts on health policy processes. The Control of Marketing Promotion of Infant and Young Child Food Act B.E. 2560 (the Act) was implemented in Thailand in 2017, but there have been no studies documenting CPA during its policy processes. Furthermore, the effects of CPA on the Act and how non-industry stakeholders dealt with the CPA have not been explored. This study aimed to analyze the CPA of baby food companies in Thailand, its effects on the Act, and how policymakers have responded to CPA around the Act. Methods This qualitative study applied an established framework developed by Mialon and colleagues to collect and systematically analyze publicly available information from seven baby food companies with the highest percentage market share in Thailand. In-depth interviews were also used to explore how people involved in the policy process of the Act experienced the CPA of baby food companies, the consequent effects on the Act, and how they responded to the CPA. Results During development of the Act, baby food companies used two main strategies, ‘information and messaging’ and ‘constituency building’. We found the companies met policymakers, and they employed evidence or provided information that was favorable to companies. Also, they established relationships with policymakers, health organizations, communities and media. The effects of CPA were that the scope of products controlled by the Act was reduced, and CPA led relevant people to misunderstand and have concerns about the Act. Officials and others countered the influence of CPA by raising awareness and building understanding among involved people, as well as avoiding contact with companies informally. Conclusions CPA consists of a variety of practices that resulted in a weakened Act in Thailand. Government officials and other non-industry stakeholders employed strategies to counteract this influence. This study suggests the Department of Health, and other relevant government agencies, would benefit from establishing safeguards and protections against CPA. Efforts to raise awareness about the harms of CPA within and outside of government and establish a systematic monitoring system, including avoid conflict of interest in policy process would improve policymaking and implementation of the Act.

Corporate political activity in the context of unhealthy food advertising restrictions across Transport for London: A qualitative case study

Background Diets with high proportions of foods high in fat, sugar, and/or salt (HFSS) contribute to malnutrition and rising rates of childhood obesity, with effects throughout the life course. Given compelling evidence on the detrimental impact HFSS advertising has on children’s diets, the World Health Organization unequivocally supports the adoption of restrictions on HFSS marketing and advertising. In February 2019, the Greater London Authority introduced novel restrictions on HFSS advertising across Transport for London (TfL), one of the most valuable out-of-home advertising estates. In this study, we examined whether and how commercial actors attempted to influence the development of these advertising restrictions. Methods and findings Using requests under the Freedom of Information Act, we obtained industry responses to the London Food Strategy consultation, correspondence between officials and key industry actors, and information on meetings. We used an existing model of corporate political activity, the Policy Dystopia Model, to systematically analyse arguments and activities used to counter the policy. The majority of food and advertising industry consultation respondents opposed the proposed advertising restrictions, many promoting voluntary approaches instead. Industry actors who supported the policy were predominantly smaller businesses. To oppose the policy, industry respondents deployed a range of strategies. They exaggerated potential costs and underplayed potential benefits of the policy, for instance, warning of negative economic consequences and questioning the evidence underlying the proposal. Despite challenging the evidence for the policy, they offered little evidence in support of their own claims. Commercial actors had significant access to the policy process and officials through the consultation and numerous meetings, yet attempted to increase access, for example, in applying to join the London Child Obesity Taskforce and inviting its members to events. They also employed coalition management, engaging directly and through business associations to amplify their arguments. Some advertising industry actors also raised the potential of legal challenges. The key limitation of this study is that our data focused on industry–policymaker interactions; thus, our findings are unable to present a comprehensive picture of political activity. Conclusions In this study, we identified substantial opposition from food and advertising industry actors to the TfL advertising restrictions. We mapped arguments and activities used to oppose the policy, which might help other public authorities anticipate industry efforts to prevent similar restrictions in HFSS advertising. Given the potential consequences of commercial influence in these kinds of policy spaces, public bodies should consider how they engage with industry actors.