The Audit Committee is a specialized agency under the Board of Directors, and supervising the company's internal control is one of its duties. This article takes the 2012-2017 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed company as a research sample, focusing on the chairmen, CEOs, CFOs, board secretaries and executive directors other than the CEO, discussing the impact of their concurrent appointment as audit committee members on the arising, correction and repair of internal control weakness in listed companies. The study found that different types of executives who are concurrently members of the audit committee would lead the internal control weakness to different directions. In general, excluding some less significant results, executives concurrently serve as members of the audit committee could stimulate the arising of internal control weakness and promote the correction and repair of the existing internal control weakness of the listed company. This indicates that when a listed company does not have internal control weakness, its executive layer intervention will weaken the effectiveness of the audit committee's governance and induce the arising of internal control weakness. Conversely, when the company inherently has internal control weakness, the intervention will strengthen the effectiveness of the audit committee's governance, making the audit committee more effective in monitoring internal control weakness. In addition, an important finding is that the existence of the Secretary of the board among the members of the audit committee will limit the chairs’ role in promoting internal control deficiencies.