Country‐, Firm‐ and Director‐level Risk and Responsibilities and Independent Director Compensation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Melis ◽  
Luigi Rombi
Keyword(s):  
Independent Director ◽  
Director Compensation

Independent director compensation, corruption, and monitoring

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natasha Burns ◽  
Anna Kapalczynski ◽  
John K. Wald
Keyword(s):  
Independent Director ◽  
Director Compensation

scholarly journals State Ownership, Legal Institution, and Independent Director Compensation: An Exploratory Study in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 430-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pattarin Adithipyangkul ◽  
Tak Yan Leung
Keyword(s):  
Exploratory Study ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Legal Institution ◽  
Director Compensation

Litigation Risk and the Independent Director Labor Market

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dain C. Donelson ◽  
Elizabeth Tori ◽  
Christopher G. Yust
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Litigation Risk

scholarly journals Limiting role of resource dependence: an examination of director interlocks, board meetings and family ownership

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Sukumara Panicker ◽  
Rajesh Srinivas Upadhyayula
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Resource Provisioning ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis paper attempts to examine the activity and involvement of board of directors in internationalization activities of firms in emerging markets, by evaluating the resource provisioning roles of interlocks provided by board of directors, and the frequency of board meetings. We demonstrate that the effectiveness of board involvement is contingent upon the levels of family ownership in firms since family ownership could impact the firm’s ability to utilize the presence of different types of board members.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test our hypotheses on a sample of listed Indian companies, extracted from the Prowess database published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a database of the financial performance of Indian companies. On a panel of 3,133 firm years of 605 unique Indian firms with foreign investments, over a time period of 2006–2017, the authors apply different estimation techniques.FindingsThe results demonstrate that both board meeting frequency and director interlocks are instrumental in supporting internationalization activities in emerging market firms. However, family ownership moderates the role of insider and independent interlocks on internationalization investments in different ways; the authors find that interlocks provided by independent directors support internationalization activities in family firms, whereas those provided by insider directors do not. Further, the study also finds that board meetings are less effective in internationalization of family firms.Practical implicationsThe authors conclude that family firms aiming at international diversification require to develop more connected and networked independent directors to enable internationalization in firms. While independent director interlocks enhance the international investments, it is also useful to know that board meetings are ineffective in utilizing the resources in family firms. This points to the possibility that family firms should device mechanisms to integrate family meetings with board meetings so that they can utilize the within-family processes to aid in their internationalization decisions.Originality/valueThe study contributes to resource dependence theory by understanding its limiting role in family firms. Theoretically, it helps delineate the limiting resource provision role of the insider directors vis-à-vis independent directors. The authors argue that the resource provision role of insider director interlocks does not effectively help in internationalization in comparison to independent director interlocks in family-dominated firms. Consequently, the study shows the limiting role of resource provision and utilization by family-owned firms in comparison to non-family-owned firms.

Outside director compensation and firm performance

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hempel ◽  
Charles Fay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Outside Director

Pay to Incentivize or Pay to Capture: Evidence from Independent Director Behaviour in China

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (1) ◽  
pp. 15466
Author(s):  
Jyun-Ying Fu
Keyword(s):  
Independent Director

Do Independent Director Departures Predict Future Bad Events?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
RRdiger Fahlenbrach ◽  
Angie Low ◽  
Renn M. Stulz
Keyword(s):  
Independent Director

scholarly journals CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan E. Brick ◽  
Oded Palmon ◽  
John K. Wald
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Director Compensation

Board of Director Compensation in China: To Pay or Not to Pay? How Much to Pay?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zonghao Chen ◽  
Michael O'Connor Keefe
Keyword(s):  
Director Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director

scholarly journals Family business, director compensation and board efficacy: the case of Taiwan

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
Tsun-Jui Hsieh ◽  
Yu-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Specific Pattern ◽  
Chinese Family ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Outside Director ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy. By using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed. The findings provide western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board independence. We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia.

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