Board of Director Compensation in China: To Pay or Not to Pay? How Much to Pay?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zonghao Chen ◽  
Michael O'Connor Keefe
Keyword(s):  
Director Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director

Is board of director compensation excessive in restaurant firms?

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 149-158
Author(s):  
Sung Gyun Mun ◽  
Soyon Paek ◽  
Linda Woo ◽  
Sangwon Park
Keyword(s):  
Director Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Restaurant Firms

Board of director compensation in China: To pay or not to pay? How much to pay?

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 66-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zonghao Chen ◽  
Michael O’Connor Keefe
Keyword(s):  
Director Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director

Board of director compensation in China: It pays to be connected

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 101394
Author(s):  
Zonghao Chen ◽  
Michael O'Connor Keefe ◽  
Jameson K.M. Watts
Keyword(s):  
Director Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director

scholarly journals Quid-pro-quo exchanges of outside director defined benefit pension plans for equity-based compensation

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
CYNTHIA J. CAMPBELL ◽  
MARK L. POWER ◽  
ROGER D. STOVER
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Pension Plans ◽  
Defined Benefit ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Outside Director

The independence of outside directors is critical to corporate board effectiveness. We examine a unique period in corporate governance when outside directors' defined benefit pensions are replaced with increases in equity. Firms with pension plans significantly underperform their industry in terms of stock returns. Firms terminating the pension plans in exchange for equity have significant increases in stock returns relative to their industry subsequent to the change. All samples outperform the ROA and ROE industry medians both before and after the change in compensation, indicating pressure from organized investors likely comes from stock performance, not accounting performance. Investor rights pressure and outside director compensation and not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain firms altering outside director compensation, with board of director effectiveness improving.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and firm performance in an emerging market - An exploratory analysis of Pakistan

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-225
Author(s):  
Mohammed Nishat ◽  
Rozina Shaheen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Governance Index ◽  
Governance Practices

This preliminary study aims to develop a corporate governance index based on governance practices followed by the listed firms at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). Since the corporate governance concept is at very initial level of its implementation and practices, this study also analyses the structure of good corporate governance practices and level of awareness about new regulations of corporate governance implemented by Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan. The data is collected through a structured questionnaire covering seven corporate governance categories: audit committee, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, and the progressive practices during the year 2004. The results indicate that all of the firm performance measures; return on equity, net profit margin, sales growth and dividend yield (except Tobin’s Q) have their expected positive relation with corporate governance index score (Gov-Score) and are significant in correlation and decile analysis. This suggests that firms with relatively poor governance are relatively less profitable, less valuable, and pay less cash to their shareholders. The role of audit and board of director are highly associated with good performance while the governance categories related to director’s education and charter/bylaws are least associated with good performance

Market Competition, Managerial Incentives and Agency Cost

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 937-955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rayenda Khresna Brahmana ◽  
Hui San Loh ◽  
Maria Kontesa
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Competitive Firm ◽  
Size Firm

This study investigates the determinants of board of director compensation from the view of strategic management. Specifically, this study examines the association between product market competition and directors’ compensation for a sample of 524 listed firms in Malaysia from 2010 to 2014. We find that there is a positive relationship between a competitive firm and its compensation to its directors. Our research indicates that managerial incentives reflect more of talent appreciation, rather than purely for acknowledging better performance or a bigger size firm. This research contests the use of agency theory and managerialism in explaining directors’ compensation, especially for the developing country context of Malaysia. Our findings also imply that firms may pay higher compensation in a competitive market.

The Effectiveness of `No` Voting Right of Institutional Investors based on Improvement of Independence of the Board of Director

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-96
Author(s):  
Yoona Lee ◽  
Kang Heum Yon ◽  
Hanna Kim
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Voting Right

Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Research Evidence ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Of Director ◽  
Composition And Structure ◽  
High Incidence ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Director Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

Due to the high incidence of fraud in Australia, regulatory reports suggest strengthening the monitoring role of the board of directors (BOD). These reports recommend greater independence and no duality (chairperson of the BOD should not be the CEO) on the BOD. While there is no Australian evidence, research evidence in the U.S. supports these suggested reforms. It is not clear whether the research evidence observed in the U.S. will generalize to the Australian setting because of contextual differences. This study extends the U.S. findings to the Australian context and investigates the relationship between two attributes of the BOD, independence and duality, and fraud. In addition, I examine whether institutional ownership plays a role in the context of fraud. The more highly concentrated institutional ownership in Australia suggests the presence of some relationship. Using a matched sample of fraud and no-fraud firms from 1988–2000, I find that as the percentage of independent directors and the percentage of independent institutional ownership increases, the likelihood of fraud decreases. As expected, the results show a positive relationship between duality and the likelihood of fraud. These results support the call for strengthening the composition and structure of the BOD in Australia.

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