BOARD CHANGE AND FIRM RISK: DO NEW DIRECTORS MEAN UNSTABLE CORPORATE POLICIES?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiqun Feng ◽  
Jason Zezhong Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies

scholarly journals CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1757-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Moqi Groen-Xu
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Remaining Time

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

scholarly journals Board diversity, firm risk, and corporate policies

2018 ◽  
Vol 127 (3) ◽  
pp. 588-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gennaro Bernile ◽  
Vineet Bhagwat ◽  
Scott Yonker
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Corporate Policies

CEO Age, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Serfling
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Age

Managerial Attributes, Incentives, and Performance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L Coles ◽  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Parameter Estimates ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Executive Incentives ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Policy Risk ◽  
Time Invariant

Abstract We examine the relative importance of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in determining executive compensation incentives and firm policy, risk, and performance. First, we decompose executive incentives into time-variant and time-invariant firm and manager components. Manager fixed effects supply 73% (60%) of explained variation in delta (vega). Second, controlling for manager fixed effects alters parameter estimates and corresponding inference on observed firm and manager characteristics. Third, larger CEO delta (vega) fixed effects predict better firm performance (riskier corporate policies and higher firm risk). These results suggest that the delta (vega) fixed effect captures managerial ability (risk aversion). (JEL G3, G32, G34, J24, J31, J33) Received September 7, 2018; editorial decision February 21, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

scholarly journals Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gennaro Bernile ◽  
Vineet Bhagwat ◽  
Scott E. Yonker
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Corporate Policies

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

2012 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omesh Kini ◽  
Ryan Williams
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies

scholarly journals CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Cain ◽  
Stephen B. McKeon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Project Selection ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Personal Risk ◽  
Scope Of The Firm ◽  
Corporate Risk

AbstractThis study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender Diversity Affect Firm Risk?

CFA Digest ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Bilney
Keyword(s):  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Firm Risk

Do Shareholder Preferences Affect Corporate Policies?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Sulaeman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Policies

Distance Matters! Shareholder Proximity and Corporate Policies

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidhi Chhaochharia ◽  
Alok Kumar ◽  
Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Policies
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