scholarly journals Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gennaro Bernile ◽  
Vineet Bhagwat ◽  
Scott E. Yonker
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Corporate Policies

scholarly journals Board diversity, firm risk, and corporate policies

2018 ◽  
Vol 127 (3) ◽  
pp. 588-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gennaro Bernile ◽  
Vineet Bhagwat ◽  
Scott Yonker
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Corporate Policies

Board diversity and firm risk-taking in the tourism sector: Moderating effects of board independence, CEO duality, and free cash flows

2021 ◽  
pp. 135481662110143
Author(s):  
Ozgur Ozdemir ◽  
Ezgi Erkmen ◽  
Fatemeh Binesh
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Reduction Effect ◽  
Task Oriented ◽  
Free Cash Flows

This study examines the effect of board diversity on risk-taking for tourism firms and analyzes the moderating effect of board independence, CEO duality, and free cash flows in this proposed relationship. Using a composite index of board diversity and a sample of tourism firms from the US hotel, restaurant, and airline industries, we find that greater board diversity leads to lower risk-taking, measured in standard deviation of return on assets. Moreover, we report that the risk-reduction effect of board diversity is more profound when tourism firms have less board independence and less free cash flows for investments. When board diversity is decomposed into relation-oriented and task-oriented diversity attributes, we find that only the task-oriented diversity is influential in reducing firm risk-taking for tourism firms. Akin to main analysis, the board independence and free cash flows are significant moderators of the relationship between task-oriented diversity and firm risk-taking.

scholarly journals CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1757-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Moqi Groen-Xu
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Remaining Time

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

BOARD CHANGE AND FIRM RISK: DO NEW DIRECTORS MEAN UNSTABLE CORPORATE POLICIES?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiqun Feng ◽  
Jason Zezhong Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies

CEO Age, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Serfling
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Age

Managerial Attributes, Incentives, and Performance

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L Coles ◽  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Parameter Estimates ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Executive Incentives ◽  
Editorial Decision ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Policy Risk ◽  
Time Invariant

Abstract We examine the relative importance of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in determining executive compensation incentives and firm policy, risk, and performance. First, we decompose executive incentives into time-variant and time-invariant firm and manager components. Manager fixed effects supply 73% (60%) of explained variation in delta (vega). Second, controlling for manager fixed effects alters parameter estimates and corresponding inference on observed firm and manager characteristics. Third, larger CEO delta (vega) fixed effects predict better firm performance (riskier corporate policies and higher firm risk). These results suggest that the delta (vega) fixed effect captures managerial ability (risk aversion). (JEL G3, G32, G34, J24, J31, J33) Received September 7, 2018; editorial decision February 21, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

scholarly journals The impact of board diversity on operating performance and firm risk: Evidence from the Italian market.

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doriana Cucinelli
Keyword(s):  
Operating Performance ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Italian Market ◽  
Enterprise Risk ◽  
Foreign Directors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper analyses the relationship between board diversity and some board operating performance but also the relationship between board diversity and enterprise risk. The analyses, carried out on a sample of 249 Italian companies during the period 2006-2009, show that diversity affects the operating performance of the board. The results show a significant positive relationship between the presence of independent women board directors and the frequency of the board meetings, but a negative relationship between the number of meetings and the nationality diversity. With regard to the intermediate performance, there is a significant relationship with gender diversity. Besides, the analysis shows a negative relationship between firm systematic risk and number of foreign directors

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

2012 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omesh Kini ◽  
Ryan Williams
Keyword(s):  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies

scholarly journals CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Cain ◽  
Stephen B. McKeon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Project Selection ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Personal Risk ◽  
Scope Of The Firm ◽  
Corporate Risk

AbstractThis study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

Does Diversity in The Boardroom Add Value to a Firm?

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Diversity

This study examines whether board diversity affects firm performance. We investigate this study using panel data of a sample of S&P 500 firms during a 12 year period. After controlling for industry, firm size, and other board composition variables, we find that all three board diversity variables of interest – gender, ethnicity, and age have a significant influence on firm performance. While ethnicity and age have a positive influence on firm performance, it was found that gender has a negative influence. Implications for future research are discussed.

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