scholarly journals CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Cain ◽  
Stephen B. McKeon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Project Selection ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Personal Risk ◽  
Scope Of The Firm ◽  
Corporate Risk

AbstractThis study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.

Which formula for corporate risk-taking around the world? Exploring happiness as the “black box”

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thao Phuong Tran ◽  
Anh-Tuan Le
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
The World ◽  
Corporate Risk

PurposeThis paper examines how the degree of happiness affects corporate risk-taking and the moderating influence of family ownership of firms on this relationship.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use an international sample of 17,654 firm-year observations from 24 countries around the world from 2008 to 2016.FindingsUsing the happiness index from the World Happiness Report developed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the authors show that a country's overall happiness is negatively correlated with risk-taking behavior by firms. The findings are robust to an alternative measure of risk-taking by firms. Further analyses document that the negative influence of happiness on firm risk-taking is more pronounced for family-owned firms.Practical implicationsThe paper is consistent with the notion that happier people are likely to be more risk-averse in making financial decisions, which, in turn, reduces corporate risk-taking.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the broad literature on the determinants of corporate risk-taking and the growing literature on the role of sentiment on investment decisions. The authors contribute to the current debate about family-owned firms by demonstrating that the presence of family trust strengthens the negative influence of happiness on corporate risk-taking, a topic that has been unexplored in previous studies.

scholarly journals CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1757-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Moqi Groen-Xu
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Remaining Time

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

scholarly journals Corporate risk and the humpback of CEO narcissism

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 252-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Aabo ◽  
Nicklas Bang Eriksen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Stock Return ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Moderate Degree ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Stock Return Volatility ◽  
Unobtrusive Measure ◽  
Ceo Narcissism ◽  
High Level ◽  
Corporate Risk

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking. Design/methodology/approach The authors provide a novel and unobtrusive measure of CEO narcissism based on LinkedIn profiling. The authors investigate the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking (stock return volatility) for a sample of 475 US manufacturing firms in the period 2010-2014. Findings The authors find an inverse U-shape relationship between CEO narcissism and stock return volatility. The inverse U-shape relationship (the “humpback”) is caused by the paradoxical nature of the narcissistic personality in which the self-esteem is high but at the same time fragile with a combination of self-admiration and a constant need of having this positive self-view confirmed. The results are robust to alternative specifications of CEO narcissism and corporate risk taking. The results are economically meaningful. Thus, a moderate degree of CEO narcissism – as compared to a very low or a very high level of CEO narcissism – is associated with an increase in corporate risk taking of approximately 12 percent. Originality/value Previous literature provides multiple analyses on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate decisions. As opposed to overconfidence, narcissism is a personality trait having both cognitive and behavioral dimensions. This paper provides a novel contribution to the growing literature on the association between managerial biases/traits and corporate decision-making.

The effects of ownership concentration and corporate governance on corporate risk-taking

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seksak Jumreornvong ◽  
Sirimon Treepongkaruna ◽  
Panu Prommin ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Instrumental Variable Analysis ◽  
Developed Economies ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
Variable Analysis

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effects of ownership concentration and corporate governance on the extent of risk-taking in an important emerging economy – Thailand. Design/methodology/approach The results are corroborated by additional analysis, including an instrumental-variable analysis and propensity score matching. Findings Large owners are under-diversified and are thus more vulnerable to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, they tend to advocate less risky corporate policies and strategies. Consistent with this notion, the authors find that more concentrated ownership induces firms to take significantly less risk. Originality/value Ownership in Thai firms is substantially more concentrated than that in developed economies, providing a unique opportunity to study the effect of highly concentrated ownership on risk-taking.

scholarly journals Corporate ownership structure and risk-taking: evidence from Japan

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
SunEae Chun ◽  
MinHwan Lee
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Risk Level ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Risk

We examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking in Japan over the sample periods of 2000 2010. Reflecting the ongoing changes in the ownership structure in Japan, we incorporate the various kinds of insider and outsider ownership in the analysis. Ownership such as concentrated ownership, ownership by closely related parties, financial institutions comprising banks and insurance companies and managers are categorized into inside ownership, while ownership by foreigners or financial institution such as investment trusts or pension funds are categorized into outside ownership. The ownership structure is found to have a different impact on the firm’s risk-taking behavior. The study shows that concentrated ownership or ownership by closely related parties affect the firm risks in a convex manner and encourages the firm management to take more risk when the firms have growth opportunities. On the other hand, ownership by financial institutions such as bank and insurance companies, does not seem to affect the firm risk level. This implies that the financial institutions fail to play their role of a shareholder monitor. When managerial ownership is allowed, it is found that Japanese managers’ incentives are aligned with those of shareholders. Contrary to the conventional entrenchment hypothesis, however, managers seem to take more risk as the share of managerial ownership increases. Foreign investors are found to enhance corporate risk-taking in a monotonic manner and do not bias corporate investment in a conservative direction in pursuit of their short-term gains. Domestic institutions such as investment trusts or pension funds are found to neither affect the firm risk level nor enhance the firm value.

scholarly journals Corporate Policies of Republican Managers

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 1279-1310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irena Hutton ◽  
Danling Jiang ◽  
Alok Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Natural Experiments ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Investment Policies ◽  
Corporate Managers ◽  
Political Preferences ◽  
Lehman Brothers

AbstractWe demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence corporate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these exogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

scholarly journals Risk committee, corporate risk-taking and firm value

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Muhammad A. Cheema ◽  
Yimei Man
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Potential Risks ◽  
Risk Committee ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

PurposeThe authors empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value.Design/methodology/approachThe authors argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance, which reduces corporate risk-taking and strengthens the firm value that might improve investor protection.FindingsThe authors find corporate risk-taking decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. The authors also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk committee is positively associated with firm value.Practical implicationsThe evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential risks and implement a proper risk management system.Originality/valueThis is the first paper that investigates the association between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee and firm risk-taking in a multi-industry setting. Also, our research extends the association between a stand-alone risk committee and firm value.

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