scholarly journals The bargaining set and coalition formation

Author(s):  
Ken‐Ichi Shimomura
Author(s):  
Emiliya A. Lazarova ◽  
Peter E. M. Borm ◽  
Maria Montero ◽  
Hans Reijnierse

Author(s):  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
James P. Kahan ◽  
Sandra G. Funk ◽  
Abraham D. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Paul Chaisty ◽  
Nic Cheeseman ◽  
Timothy J. Power

This chapter summarizes the main parameters of coalitional presidentialism and the key concepts, definitions, explanatory frameworks, indicators, and propositions. It summarizes our understanding of coalitional presidentialism; the distinction between coalition formation and maintenance; the definition of coalitions; the multidimensional understanding of coalition management (the ‘presidential toolbox’); and an analytical framework that emphasizes the motivation of presidents to achieve cost minimization under constraints determined by system-level, coalition-level, and conjunctural factors. It also summarizes our main empirical findings: (1) the characteristics of presidential tools, (2) the substantive patterns of their deployment, (3) the factors that shape the costs of using these tools, (4) the actual (observed) costs of using them, and (5) the potential for imperfect substitutability of these tools. Finally, it concludes with some reflections on the current state of the research on comparative presidentialism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg ◽  
Peter Sudhölter

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.


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