Decentralized resource allocation for interdependent infrastructures resilience: a cooperative game approach

Author(s):  
Shima Mohebbi ◽  
Katherine Barnett ◽  
Babak Aslani

2019 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 30-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katty Rohoden ◽  
Rebeca Estrada ◽  
Hadi Otrok ◽  
Zbigniew Dziong




2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez

Abstract The Coase theorem states that where there are externalities and no transaction costs resource allocation is Pareto-optimal and independent of the stakeholders’ legal position. This result has been challenged many times. In the cooperative game approach to resource allocation, the refutation is made by constructing a three-person game which has an empty core under one set of liability rules—which implies that optimal allocations are coalitionally unstable–and a nonempty core under another set. In this example, however, the probability that the core is non-empty is rather high (5/6). Yet, even if coalitionally stable Pareto-optimal arrangements are likely, to establish the plain validity of the Coase theorem it must be shown that the legal neutrality statement also holds. We show that for the three-person cooperative game example mentioned above, the probability that the two assertions of the Coase theorem hold can be as low as 3/8.



Author(s):  
Patrick Lieser ◽  
Nils Richerzhagen ◽  
Tim Feuerbach ◽  
Leonhard Nobach ◽  
Doreen Bohnstedt ◽  
...  




Econometrica ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonid Hurwicz ◽  
Roy Radner ◽  
Stanley Reiter


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 1415-1435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Iturralde ◽  
Anne Wei ◽  
Tara Ali-Yahiya ◽  
André-Luc Beylot


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