Group Identity and the Moral Hazard Problem: Experimental Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 1061-1081 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhasish Dugar ◽  
Quazi Shahriar
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
Muntasir Murshed ◽  
Syed Rashid Ali ◽  
Mohammad Haseeb ◽  
Solomon Prince Nathaniel

Author(s):  
Navin A. Bapat

This study argues that the war on terror can be explained as an effort to cement the U.S. dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency by expanding American control over the global energy markets. Since the 1970s, the states of OPEC agreed to denominate their oil sales in U.S. dollars in exchange for American military protection. The 9/11 attacks gave the U.S. cover to eliminate current challengers to this system while simultaneously striking new security agreements with host states throughout the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia that are critical to the extraction, sale, and transportation of energy to global markets. However, the U.S. security guarantee soon created a moral hazard problem. Since the host states had American protection, they were free to engage in corrupt behaviors—while labeling their political opponents as terrorists. To make matters worse, these states had incentives to keep terrorists in their territory, given that doing so would force the U.S. to protect them indefinitely. As a result of this moral hazard problem, terrorists in the host states gradually grew in power and transitioned to insurgencies, which caused a rapid escalation in violence. Facing the increasing cost of securing the host states, the U.S. was forced to scale back its security guarantee, which in turn contributed to greater violence in the energy market. Although the U.S. began the war to maintain its economic dominance, it now finds itself locked into a seemingly permanent war for its economic security.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Stevens ◽  
Alex Thevaranjan

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 480-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
YiLi Chien ◽  
Joon Song

We offer an explanation for why perks are overprovided to high-profile CEOs. Hidden saving by an agent makes it difficult for a principal to control the agent's moral hazard problem. However, an agent typically cannot save perks; for example, a CEO who owns the right to use a private jet for personal use cannot bank the unused airplane hours. Thus, the principal may oversupply the agent perks to avoid the hidden saving problem. When the agent canbothexert lower effortandsave wage income, i.e., in the presence of thedouble deviation problem, we show that the principal supplies more perks than the agent would have purchased on his own (i.e.,excessiveperks).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document