Modelling the public moral hazard problem of international remittance inflows in Bangladesh

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
Muntasir Murshed ◽  
Syed Rashid Ali ◽  
Mohammad Haseeb ◽  
Solomon Prince Nathaniel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
The Public ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem

Modelling the Public Moral Hazard problem of International Remittance inflows in Bangladesh

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Solomon Prince Solomon ◽  
Syed Rashid Ali ◽  
Mohammad Haseeb ◽  
Muntasir Murshed
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
The Public ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Public perception and acceptance of negative emission technologies – framing effects in Switzerland

2021 ◽  
Vol 167 (3-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariane Wenger ◽  
Michael Stauffacher ◽  
Irina Dallo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
The Public ◽  
Net Zero ◽  
Negative Emission ◽  
Public Opinion Perception ◽  
Negative Emission Technologies ◽  
Technological Fix

AbstractLimiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires negative emission technologies (NETs), which remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and permanently store it to offset unavoidable emissions. Successful large-scale deployment of NETs depends not only on technical, biophysical, ecological, and economic factors, but also on public perception and acceptance. However, previous studies on this topic have been scarce. In 2019, Switzerland adopted a net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 target, which will require the use of NETs. To examine the current Swiss public perception and acceptance of five different NETs, we conducted an online survey with Swiss citizens (N = 693). By using a between-subjects design, we investigated differences in public opinion, perception, and acceptance across three of the most used frames in the scientific literature — technological fix, moral hazard, and climate emergency. Results showed that the public perception and acceptance of NETs does not differ between the frames. The technological fix frame best reflected participants’ opinion, whereas participants perceived the moral hazard frame the least credible and the climate emergency frame the most unclear. Moreover, our findings confirm the public’s unfamiliarity with NETs. We found no strong opposition, as participants indicated a moderate acceptance and a neutral evaluation of all five NETs, with afforestation standing out as the most accepted and positively evaluated NET. We conclude that, in the future, the public debate on NETs should be intensified, and the public perception should be monitored regularly to inform the development of NETs.

Monsters to Destroy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Navin A. Bapat
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Energy Markets ◽  
Economic Security ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
Reserve Currency ◽  
American Military ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem ◽  
The U.S

This study argues that the war on terror can be explained as an effort to cement the U.S. dollar as the world’s foremost reserve currency by expanding American control over the global energy markets. Since the 1970s, the states of OPEC agreed to denominate their oil sales in U.S. dollars in exchange for American military protection. The 9/11 attacks gave the U.S. cover to eliminate current challengers to this system while simultaneously striking new security agreements with host states throughout the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia that are critical to the extraction, sale, and transportation of energy to global markets. However, the U.S. security guarantee soon created a moral hazard problem. Since the host states had American protection, they were free to engage in corrupt behaviors—while labeling their political opponents as terrorists. To make matters worse, these states had incentives to keep terrorists in their territory, given that doing so would force the U.S. to protect them indefinitely. As a result of this moral hazard problem, terrorists in the host states gradually grew in power and transitioned to insurgencies, which caused a rapid escalation in violence. Facing the increasing cost of securing the host states, the U.S. was forced to scale back its security guarantee, which in turn contributed to greater violence in the energy market. Although the U.S. began the war to maintain its economic dominance, it now finds itself locked into a seemingly permanent war for its economic security.

Why does bank screening matter? Private information and publicly traded securities

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 478-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Harold Neave
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Equilibrium Pricing ◽  
The Public ◽  
Large Market

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use an equilibrium model to identify the public and private informational requirements for equilibrium pricing and shows that unless these informational requirements are met, skin-in-the-game policies will not be fully effective against moral hazard for banks with relatively large market share. Selling securitizations with recourse can be. Design/methodology/approach The single-period model shows equilibrium prices depend on both public and private information, the latter produced as banks screen loans. If bank has a sufficiently large market share, it can profit by omitting the screening unless investors can detect the change. The author derives the profit function for not screening, shows that a skin-in-the-game policy cannot fully offset its incentives, and proposes a sale with recourse policy that can. Findings To value securitizations correctly, investors require both publicly and privately available information. If investors cannot monitor banks closely, correct pricing can be frustrated by profit maximization incentives, since banks with large market shares can profit from not screening. Skin-in-the-game policies cannot fully offset these incentives. Research limitations/implications The equilibrium model identifies the public and private informational requirements for equilibrium pricing and shows that unless these informational requirements are met, skin-in-the-game policies will not be fully effective for banks with relatively large market share. Selling securitizations with recourse can be more fully effective. Practical implications If it is difficult for investors to obtain private information, skin-in-the-game policies are not provide fully effective remedies against moral hazard. Sales with recourse policies offer promise because they are easy for investors to understand and difficult to evade. Social implications Trading on the basis of private information can create perverse incentives, and appropriate corrective policies can help offset them. Originality/value The general equilibrium methodology, the findings of incentives to avoid screening, the flaws with skin-in-the-game policies, and the proposal for sale with recourse are all new.

A moral solution to the moral hazard problem

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Stevens ◽  
Alex Thevaranjan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem

A NOTE ON USING EXCESSIVE PERKS TO RESTRAIN THE HIDDEN SAVING PROBLEM

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 480-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
YiLi Chien ◽  
Joon Song
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem ◽  
Personal Use ◽  
The Right ◽  
Deviation Problem ◽  
Wage Income

We offer an explanation for why perks are overprovided to high-profile CEOs. Hidden saving by an agent makes it difficult for a principal to control the agent's moral hazard problem. However, an agent typically cannot save perks; for example, a CEO who owns the right to use a private jet for personal use cannot bank the unused airplane hours. Thus, the principal may oversupply the agent perks to avoid the hidden saving problem. When the agent canbothexert lower effortandsave wage income, i.e., in the presence of thedouble deviation problem, we show that the principal supplies more perks than the agent would have purchased on his own (i.e.,excessiveperks).

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