scholarly journals Crystal toxins and the volunteer's dilemma in bacteria

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 310-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matishalin Patel ◽  
Ben Raymond ◽  
Michael B. Bonsall ◽  
Stuart A. West

2018 ◽  

1AbstractThe growth and virulence of the bacteriaBacillus thuringiensisdepends on the production of Cry toxins, which are used to perforate the gut of its host. Successful invasion of the host relies on producing a threshold amount of toxin, after which there is no benefit from producing more toxin. Consequently, the production of Cry toxin appears to be a different type of social problem compared with the public goods scenarios that bacteria often encounter. We show that selection for toxin production is a volunteer’s dilemma. We make the specific predictions that: (1) selection for toxin production depends upon an interplay between the number of bacterial cells that each host ingests, and the genetic relatedness between those cells; (2) cheats that do not produce toxin gain an advantage when at low frequencies, and at high bacterial density, allowing them to be maintained in a population alongside toxin producing cells. More generally, our results emphasise the diversity of the social games that bacteria play.



2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiji Kawagoe ◽  
Taisuke Matsubae ◽  
Hirokazu Takizawa ◽  
Tetsuo Yamamori


Author(s):  
Yukari Jessica Tham ◽  
Takaaki Hashimoto ◽  
Kaori Karasawa




2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.





2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-308
Author(s):  
H. Zhou ◽  
W. Hu ◽  
Q. Huang ◽  
M. Abouzaid ◽  
H. Jin ◽  
...  


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