scholarly journals Extended cognition, the new mechanists' mutual manipulability criterion, and the challenge of trivial extendedness

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-561
Author(s):  
Beate Krickel
Author(s):  
Heather Battaly

What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off? This chapter suggests that VR and EC are not obviously incompatible, and that each might fruitfully contribute to the other. Although there has been an explosion of recent work at the intersection of virtue epistemology and EC, this work has focused almost exclusively on the reliabilist side of virtue epistemology. Little has been said about the intersection of VR and EC. This chapter takes initial steps toward filling that gap.


Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016555152098549
Author(s):  
Donghee Shin

The recent proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) gives rise to questions on how users interact with AI services and how algorithms embody the values of users. Despite the surging popularity of AI, how users evaluate algorithms, how people perceive algorithmic decisions, and how they relate to algorithmic functions remain largely unexplored. Invoking the idea of embodied cognition, we characterize core constructs of algorithms that drive the value of embodiment and conceptualizes these factors in reference to trust by examining how they influence the user experience of personalized recommendation algorithms. The findings elucidate the embodied cognitive processes involved in reasoning algorithmic characteristics – fairness, accountability, transparency, and explainability – with regard to their fundamental linkages with trust and ensuing behaviors. Users use a dual-process model, whereby a sense of trust built on a combination of normative values and performance-related qualities of algorithms. Embodied algorithmic characteristics are significantly linked to trust and performance expectancy. Heuristic and systematic processes through embodied cognition provide a concise guide to its conceptualization of AI experiences and interaction. The identified user cognitive processes provide information on a user’s cognitive functioning and patterns of behavior as well as a basis for subsequent metacognitive processes.


2010 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Shapiro

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