Gellius and Gallus on the Limits of Regret

Aulus Gellius reports a set of criticisms of Cicero raised by Asinius Gallus. The criticisms include the claim that Cicero uses the notion of regret (paenitentia) incorrectly by implying that regret may be an appropriate response to something not voluntarily performed or chosen. This claim is assessed in the light both of the general picture of ancient accounts of regret assembled so far and also in the light of R. Jay Wallace’s recent account of the limits of regret and the relationship between regret and affirmation. This returns to the discussion of what a virtuous person may and may not regret.

Grieving Our Way Back to Meaningfulness

The deaths of those on whom our practical identities rely generate a sense of disorientation or alienation from the world seemingly at odds with life being meaningful. In the terms put forth in Cheshire Calhoun's recent account of meaningfulness in life, because their existence serves as a metaphysical presupposition of our practical identities, their deaths threaten to upend a background frame of agency against which much of our choice and deliberation takes place. Here I argue for a dual role for grief in addressing this threat to life's meaningfulness. Inasmuch as grief's object is the loss of our relationship with the deceased as it was prior to their death, grief serves to alert us to the threat to our practical identities that their deaths pose to us and motivates us to defuse this threat by revising our practical identities to reflect the modification in our relationship necessitated by their deaths. Simultaneously, the emotional complexity and richness of grief episodes provides an abundance of normative evidence regarding our relationship with the deceased and our practical identities, evidence that can enable us to re-establish our practical identities and thereby recover a sense of our lives as meaningful.

Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

There are two aims of the paper. The first is to critically analyse the claim that hope can be regarded as an intellectual virtue, as proposed by Nancy E. Snow (2013) in her recent account of hope set within the project of regulative epistemology. The second aim is to explore the problem of rationality of hope. Section one of the paper explains two different interpretations of the key notion of hope and discusses certain features to be found in hope-that and hope-in. Section two addresses the question of whether hope could be interpreted as an intellectual virtue. To develop an argument against that view, a brief account of the notion of epistemic virtue is provided. Section three analyses the problem of rationality of hope and the parallels between rational belief and rational hope; the section focuses on what exactly makes a particular hope-that a rational and justified hope. Belief that p is possible/probable is part of the meaning of hope that p; therefore, it is assumed that rationality of hope cannot be considered in isolation from rationality of belief. It is argued that the “standard account” of the reasonableness of hope, which is found in the analytic literature, does not meet the standards of epistemic responsibility and needs rectifying.

The character of Controlled schools in Northern Ireland: A complementary perspective to that of Gracie and Brown

The aim of this article is to interact with Anita Gracie and Andrew W Brown’s recent account of the historical development and nature of Controlled schools and of religious education in Northern Ireland in this journal. A complementary perspective is used to illustrate how the relationship between the Protestant churches and Controlled schools has evolved, and the bearing this has on how best to describe them. This is followed by a consideration of their claim that the type of education and of religious education practised in Anglican schools in England provide a model for Controlled schools to emulate.

To Predict or to Memorize: Prominence in Inaugural Addresses

The assignment of phrasal prominence has been variously attributed to syntactic structure, part of speech, predictability, informativity, and speaker's intent. A recent account asserts that prominence is memorized on a by-word basis as Accent Ratio (AR), the likelihood that a word is accented (Nenkova et al. 2007). We examined whether AR outperforms the traditional predictors, in particular syntax and informativity, and if not, whether the traditional predictors shed light on the variance left unexplained by AR. We used a corpus of spoken American English consisting of the first inaugural addresses of six recent American presidents, hand-annotated for stress by two native English speakers. Regression models fitted to the data revealed that AR, syntax, and informativity all independently matter. Dividing the data into high-prominence and low-prominence tokens further revealed that AR and informativity are significant among low-prominence words, but only syntax is significant among high-prominence words. We conclude that although AR is a highly successful predictor, certain aspects of phrasal prominence require reference to syntax and informativity.

Historical account of endocrinal disorders in Unani medicine

Hippocratic doctrine of four humors and qualities is implicated to be a pioneer of modern endocrinology because of the concept of dyscrasia. Imbalance in humors causes disease. Unani scholars were aware of endocrinological disorders like endocrinologic syndrome (i.e., association of amenorrhea and galactorrhoea in a non-pregnant woman), castration, contraceptives techniques, infertility, obesity, diabetes etc., and also their mode of remedy, albeit with a phenomenological approach. Their understanding of the symptoms and signs related to endocrinologic syndromes, which were explained in detail in the recent account of the endocrine system, is presented here with historical chronology. The survey was carried out from the literature of the Unani system of medicine, and the same was analyzed from the observations reported in various indexed journals and reputed books. The paper details the account of endocrinologic syndrome from the Greek era to the end of the medieval ages.

Habermas and the public sphere: Rethinking a key theoretical concept

The challenge of realizing the democratic power of publics through public sphere remains acute but not hopeless. While claiming that Habermas communicative social theory offers a way forward in spite of a productive but constraining turn towards a modified social liberal frame, nonetheless three limitations of the theory are identified. The first bears on the insufficiency of the sociological evolutionist description of society relevant to the public sphere drawn from classical sociological accounts of differentiation and integration. The second identifies learning theoretical limitations of the normative interactionist, proceduralist account of democracy and democratization potentials. And the third observes on the disconnection between the theory of communicative reasoning from, on the one hand, the critique of pathologies of reasoning, and, on the other, from its implications for lifeworld rationalization. These identified limitations are intended to provide new impetus to radically rethink the public sphere as intrinsic to solving contemporary problems of democracy that Habermas’s more recent account of deliberative theory, with the public sphere merely supplementary, cannot fully do. Yet, with Habermas, this should be on the basis of advancing the communication theory of democracy.

Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law: critical notes on Pierre Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’

This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's ‘positivist’ and Whitman's ‘cultural’ comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’ cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.

Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof

In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this paper, I show that Moss's account of legal proof crucially depends on a moral norm called the rule of consideration. I argue that we have a number of reasons to be sceptical of this rule. Once we reject the rule, it is not clear that Moss's account of legal proof is either plausible or attractive.